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Thursday, 28 October 1993
at 3 p.m.

NEW YORK

President: Mr. INSANALLY
(Guyana)

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 11 ***(continued)***

REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (A/48/2)

Mr. WISNUMURTI (Indonesia): I should like at the outset to commend the President of the Security Council, Ambassador Sardenberg of Brazil, for his cogent introduction of the Security Council's annual report highlighting among other things a number of procedural measures adopted by the Council with a view to enhancing the efficiency of its work. We are confident that these could constitute a basis upon which to build our endeavours to further strengthen its efficacy.

Recent developments in the global landscape have placed the Security Council in a position of increasing importance, with ramifications for the work of the Organization and beyond. Numerous circumstances have also contributed to an unprecedented number of activities undertaken by this body. From the expansion of peace-keeping operations to the task of constantly monitoring events that threaten peace and security, the Council has seen an active agenda, and its capacity to respond is at times overburdened. We readily acknowledge that its members have responded to the numerous demands placed upon it with the sense of responsibility required of them by the provisions of the Charter. The new cooperative spirit prevailing among its members has allowed them to take a number of unanimous positions on some of the most critical and complex issues, while we are cognizant of the fact that it has failed to address effectively certain critical issues. The Council has thus reached a critical turning point in its history, and members look forward to a more effective role now that the obstacles which paralysed it for so long have been removed.

At the same time, it is the ardent desire of Indonesia and other non-aligned countries that the United Nations should become fully effective as the central instrument for a new and revitalized international order. We have always insisted that this multilateral institution should reflect the democratic spirit of equality, equity and transparency, in representation as well as in the process of decision-making. The United Nations and its principal organs should therefore periodically undergo a process of review and revitalization in order to ensure its dynamic adaptation to the evolving realities of international life so that it may continue to play a greatly strengthened role as the focal point for the management of the critical issues of our time.

It is in this light that my delegation views the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. As in the past, it provides a comprehensive account of its activities during the preceding year and describes its task in the context of its ever-increasing responsibilities. It also contains a compendium of communications and other documents as well as a listing of decisions and actions taken on the issues that were brought before it.

It is clear, however, that the report is marked by symbols and a chronology of issues and events that have occurred during the past year. We believe that the annual report required by paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Charter must be more than a mere description of activities and a reproduction of resolutions and decisions already known. It is particularly regrettable to note that it does not contain an evaluation of the issues considered by the Council or a detailed account of the work of its special committees. In

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short, it is not a document of substance commensurate with the greatly expanded work of the Security Council.

In our view, therefore, the reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly should contain an analysis and assessment of the decisions taken by the Council on each issue in order to meet the need for greater clarity and understanding of the Council's reasonings and motives in adopting decisions. In addition, in the context of accountability, transparency and openness, the contents of informal consultations should be presented in summary form in the annual reports so that the extent to which non-permanent members actually participate in decision-making processes can be ascertained and increased. Furthermore, it is essential that the membership of the United Nations at large should have adequate and timely information through an agreed mechanism or modality. It might also be desirable to submit reports more frequently in order to keep the members abreast of its activities and functions.

Consideration must also be given to reviewing the Council's relations with other principal organs, especially the General Assembly. In this context, we hold that balance is essential in the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council in conformity with their respective mandates as enshrined in the Charter. There should be greater accountability of the Council to the Assembly on decisions and actions affecting the interests of the entire international community. We further believe that it may also be timely and pertinent to undertake a constructive review of the veto powers in line with the reform of the Organization aimed at bringing about greater democratization and transparency in the work of United Nations bodies.

We also believe that restructuring and reform of the Security Council have become imperative in the light of the profound changes that have taken place on the international scene. As we are all aware, although the membership of the Organization has increased to 184, there has been no proportionate increase in the non-permanent membership. Hence, a serious review and reappraisal of the Council's membership has become necessary to ensure a more equitable and balanced representation.

Finally, we would like to express our satisfaction that the Council has agreed to implement proposals relating to its future format as well as to the adoption and timely submission of reports to the General Assembly. In the same spirit, we remain hopeful that the Security Council will be responsive to a change both in its composition and in its procedures and practices. In these endeavours, the main objective is to render the Council more responsive to changing realities and emerging challenges in a dynamic context. Indonesia is fully committed to participating constructively in the process of adaptation and reform in the firm conviction that an intensified dialogue and consultation between the Security Council and the General Assembly will be in the broader interests of all mankind.

Mr. YAÑEZ BARNUEVO (Spain) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: Once again this year the Security Council is submitting to the General Assembly its report on its work, this time for the year to 15 June 1993. This year, however, the exercise is no mere repetition of that of past years, since, in an effort that has only just begun, certain innovations have been introduced. We believe that the changes, which were explained in detail by the President of the Council, Ambassador Mota Sardenberg of Brazil, when he introduced the particular report this morning, have contributed significantly to improving the report.

The first group of improvements affects the process of adopting the report, which this year took place nearer the end of the period covered and was more widely publicized, which allows for adequate consideration by the Assembly.

Secondly, my delegation wishes to highlight the improvements seen in the contents and format of the report, which we consider make it significantly easier to read: an expanded introduction, the better to inform the reader about what is in the report; a grouping of issues and related subjects under general headings; and expanded and more detailed appendices.

We hope that in future reports it will prove possible to introduce some additional improvements, such as a more analytical introduction, better reflecting the contents, as well as a rationalized list of subjects under consideration by the Council, omitting merely historical issues unrelated to current reality.

These improvements in the report, both present and future, are part of the effort now being exerted by the Council to improve the transparency of its work and, at the same time, its efficiency; this began with the establishment last June of a Council working group on documentation and procedures. The initial results of this effort were reflected in the Note by the President of the Security Council of 30 June 1993 (S/26015) and followed up in the Note of 27 July (S/26176), which were duly communicated to the President of the General Assembly.

We believe that, given the measures that have been adopted thus far, there has been a significant - though still insufficient - improvement in the information that the States Members of the United Nations but not members of the Council receive concerning the Council's work. In point of fact, a monthly preview of the Council's

programme of work is now circulated to Members of the Organization, and informal consultations are announced beforehand, along with - as far as possible - their planned content.

Also, the worthwhile dialogue between the Council and the Assembly is being expanded through regular consultations between the Presidents of the Council and the Assembly; up until now, this has been effectively limited to the Council's annual report. Even if this dialogue, which is being conducted while still observing the jurisdictions assigned the Organization's principal organs by the Charter, is as fruitful as our common effort towards international peace and security requires, it should still be extended to all Members of the United Nations, on whose behalf the Council acts under Article 24 of the Charter.

In particular, we must take up the complex and sensitive issue of information about the course and the outcome of Security Council consultations and, possibly, of participation by States that are not members of the Council in the Council's informal discussion process when circumstances require.

What we are talking about here is, first of all, setting up an information system that would operate once informal consultations have taken place - a system that should be as comprehensive as possible, without detriment, however, to the discretion such deliberations require and that would help achieve agreement between members of the Council. Secondly, the question is one of finding mechanisms that would make it possible to take into consideration, in the Council's deliberations, the opinions of States that are particularly concerned with a particular question before any final decision has been taken.

This is a matter of great interest, and we hope that the Council will go on examining it thoroughly within the working group on documentation and procedures that it has set up.

Just glancing at the statistics on the number of meetings held and decisions taken by the Council is enough to show just how much of an increase there has been in its work over the last few years. Also, the Council is dealing with issues that are becoming ever more complex and that have an increasing and ever more powerful impact on all the States Members of the Organization. Just one example of this impact is the repercussions for many Member States' economies of applying the sanctions that the Council has imposed where necessary, under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Under these circumstances, the only way of ensuring that the Council's decisions are effective is quite simply to increase the level of participation by States that are not members of the Council and to give them more information; this would increase the legitimacy of the Council's decisions and thus enhance the prospects for seeing them implemented. This is a task to which my delegation, as it takes part in the work of the Council, will continue to contribute to its utmost.

Mr. SYCHEV (Belarus) *(interpretation from Russian)*: The Republic of Belarus attaches great importance to the Assembly's discussions of the annual report of the Security Council. We note that, in recent years, consideration of this item has not been a mere formality, and this has made it possible for all States Members of the Organization to express their views on the work of the Council, point out its achievements and shortcomings and provide specific ideas and suggestions for its further work.

Our delegation notes with satisfaction that, this time, the Security Council's report was submitted to the General Assembly in good time. The report's contents confirm the indisputable fact that the Council is carrying out an enormous amount of work towards maintaining international peace and security.

We note the major changes that have taken place, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The number of formal meetings and informal consultations that the Council has held has increased markedly. The Council is taking consensus decisions on many acute problems, promoting the peaceful settlement of many issues in various hot spots around the world. In our view, this intense activity on the part of the principal United Nations body responsible for maintaining international peace and security deserves every support.

Under Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council, in discharging its duties, acts on behalf of all the States Members of the United Nations. Thus, we find quite understandable the interest shown by States that are not Security Council members in the effectiveness of the Council's activities, in improving its procedures and methods of work and in enhancing its accountability and transparency.

The proposals towards this end that many delegations have put forward deserve, in our opinion, thorough consideration, and we are glad that the Council has already taken into account some of the observations made by representatives. These observations refer particularly to the structure of the report now before us, and also to the publication of a tentative draft programme of the Council's work for the next month. Of course, the Council's working procedures and methods still leave a great deal of room for improvement.

The Republic of Belarus supports the reforms aimed at adapting the United Nations to the fundamentally new realities and at democratizing the procedures of its main organs. Understanding as we do that under these new conditions the Security Council cannot remain as it was conceived and created half a century ago, we favour a painstaking quest for a consensus on all issues relating to its reform. Any changes affecting the Security Council - especially now, when it is working much more intensively - must not be carried out at the expense of the ability of its efforts to achieve results.

As is well known, our Republic is a candidate for non-permanent membership in the Council in 1994-1995. As our State's Minister of Foreign Affairs said during the Assembly's general debate this session,

> "... the submission of the candidature of the Republic of Belarus in the Security Council does not represent merely a spontaneous political gesture nor a hankering for pro-forma prestige. Historical circumstances are such that the experience and the potential of Belarus, at this very difficult moment in the formation of a new world order, can be of great importance to the international community".
> *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, 9th meeting, p. 27.)*

We hope that during the upcoming elections, Belarus' contribution to maintaining peace and international security will be judged on its merits, and that it will be taken into account that Belarus, as one of the founding Members of the United Nations, has only once been elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

In conclusion, I should like to express my firm conviction that the positive trends that have recently begun in the development of the Security Council's work will be further consolidated and developed, and will thus strengthen the role of the United Nations itself in solving the extremely difficult problems facing the world.

Mr. CARDENAS (Argentina) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: Today we are considering agenda item 11, on the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly covering the period from 16 June 1992 to 15 June 1993, submitted in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations.

This report, which for a number of years now might perhaps have been viewed as merely a matter of procedure, has since 1990 taken on a relevancy which is directly tied to the significant increase in the activity of the Security Council.

According to the record as reflected in the report - document A/48/2 - during the period under consideration the Security Council adopted 81 resolutions, heard 95 presidential statements, held 152 formal meetings and a still greater number of informal meetings, as well as meetings of the 10 subsidiary organs established under Article 29 of the Charter.

This activity, unprecedented in the entire history of the Security Council, reflects an international situation which allows one of the principal organs of the United Nations to operate with the harmony and firmness that the drafters of the Charter had in mind at the time, and which, on the other hand, bears witness to the outbreak of numerous regional and inter-State conflicts which, given their very nature, are jeopardizing international peace and security.

The new world scene and the increase in the number of States Members of the Organization are making us think about and discuss the reforms required to make United Nations bodies better able to meet the challenge facing us in respect of peace-keeping, economic development, and the advancement of human rights and democratic values. This process of reflection and debate must necessarily affect the work of the Security Council, and the report could serve as a benchmark for the discussion on that subject. Therefore, though we do of course appreciate the new format and the timely submission of the report itself, we would also consider it appropriate for a number of periodic reports to be submitted by the Security Council to the General Assembly in the course of the year. These reports might, whenever circumstances so require, be more detailed. This would ensure a better and smoother system of information and communication, and a better and more appropriate balance between the various bodies established by the Charter in accordance with Article 24, to which I have already referred.

My delegation will participate in this process of reflection to complement what was begun with General Assembly resolution 47/62 in relation to the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. We have already addressed a note to the Secretary-General on this subject and we will express our views on it when the Assembly takes up the item concerned.

The PRESIDENT: May I take it that the Assembly takes note of the report of the Security Council contained in document A/48/2?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: May I take it that it is the wish of the Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 11?

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 112 *(continued)*

INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL

HIGH-LEVEL PLENARY MEETINGS TO EXAMINE THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST THE ILLICIT PRODUCTION, SALE, DEMAND, TRAFFIC AND DISTRIBUTION OF NARCOTICS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES: DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/48/L.12)

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the first speaker in the debate for this meeting this afternoon, the representative of the Gambia.

Mr. SALLAH (Gambia): The holding of these high-level plenary meetings on international drug control testifies to the deep concern of the international community at the growing global drug problem.

Drug abuse and its grave consequences continue to affect every section of our communities. Countries and communities that once were spared the scourge of drug trafficking and consumption have now fallen victim to the debilitating effects of these illicit and dangerous drugs. The Gambia, which only a decade ago was a drug-free country, has in recent years been used increasingly as a transit point in the international trafficking of dangerous drugs such as heroin, cocaine and all their derivatives. The spillover effect has resulted in the use of these drugs by more and more people in the Gambia. It is regrettable to note that the problem of drug trafficking and consumption is beginning to reach dangerous proportions affecting the whole fabric of our society.

Young people, the cream of our society, are the primary targets and the largest group of victims. Most of these children, untutored in the ways of a wanton world and not knowing how to resist such temptation, become easy victims, serving both as traffickers and as consumers of the illicit drugs, thereby ensuring the continuity of the chain of trafficking and users.

The consequence for the Gambia in the rise in illicit drug trafficking and usage is that there is an unprecedented rise in violence and dangerous crimes, unknown in the nation's history. Violence within families, some with tragic consequences, has also risen. The number of drug-related medical cases has been on the rise, with some of these never to be cured or rehabilitated in society. The rate of drop-outs from schools, work and other gainful activities, almost all attributed to the drugs menace, is on the increase.

The attendant social and economic stresses and burdens imposed on the Gambia by these grave consequences of illicit drug trafficking and consumption have made a serious dent in the nation's budget affecting our planning strategies and creating some insurmountable and incalculable obstacles to the smooth implementation of the country's development programme.

The existing economic situation just described, however, should not suggest a state of total hopelessness on the part of the Government of the Gambia. The Government has met the menace head on. The percentage of the nation's limited budget allocation for illicit drug control has been increasing each year to finance new programmes and measures to combat the drug problem. The laws of the Gambia relating to illicit drug trafficking and consumption are being revised and new drug enforcement measures are being formulated and effected.

The Government continues to set up and strengthen structures and agencies relating to drug enforcement, drug rehabilitation and the sensitization and education of the public on the evils of illicit drug trafficking and consumption. Indeed, the prevention and eradication of drug abuse and illicit trafficking have become a national crusade utilizing the resources of the Government and of non-governmental organizations, and are extended to all facets of Gambian society.

The main obstacle to our national effort, however, is the lack of adequate financial and material resources. Another reason for the inadequacy of our drug control measures is that the national drug menace is linked to the international drug situation. The link between local and global drug trafficking and drug abuse has become so formidable that small States like the Gambia, with their fragile economies, are unable to combat it effectively and consistently.

Statistics on the financing of the international drug trafficking network by drug lords indicate that the money expended is usually higher than the overall national budgets of some countries. The Gambia is one such State and therefore cannot, on its own, combat successfully this global problem affecting all countries and all regions of the world. The Gambia therefore welcomes the initiative and concerted effort of the international community to arrest the growing drug problem. We will continue to rely on the United Nations and other bilateral and multilateral

cooperative efforts to evolve an international drug control programme.

The implementation of the Global Programme of Action and the Programme of Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries, in collaboration with the Financial Action Task Force, has been a source not only of great technical assistance but also of renewed hope and strength in our fight against drug trafficking and consumption at the national level. Technical assistance to developing countries on international drug control should incorporate the latest technology used in the detection of illicit drugs as well as information on the setting up of the up-to-date strategies used by drug lords in the trafficking of illicit drugs worldwide. The high cost of some of the sophisticated equipment used in drug control has not only limited the fight of the small and poor nations against drug trafficking but has also to some extent alienated them from the international effort to control global drug abuse.

Similarly, the lack or non-availability of reliable intelligence on patterns and modes of international drug trafficking have severely limited the capabilities of our drug-law enforcement agencies to investigate and suppress the international drug-distribution networks successfully. The Gambia has always maintained that there is an intimate complementarity and logical relationship between drug-law enforcement and crime prevention, because there can be no doubt that illicit-drug-related activities are based on criminal practices. A two-prong attack on illicit drug trafficking and drug abuse globally through the concerted efforts of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme and the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch would yield greater and more-lasting successes. My delegation fully supports the recommendation contained in General Assembly resolution 47/102, which invites cooperation between those two bodies.

The Gambia has realized the wisdom and benefit of mobilizing and coordinating the resources of our drug-enforcement agencies and the Crime and Justice Department in the uphill task of stemming and eradicating from our society the rising tide of illicit-drug trafficking and consumption. The results have been satisfactory, given the high number of arrests, seizures and convictions in the past 12 months. With more funds and technical assistance, we intend to expand this collective inter-agency drug-law enforcement exercise as well as improve existing treatment and rehabilitation facilities.

At the international level it is becoming increasingly necessary to consolidate the United Nations drug-enforcement programme by reviewing and synthesizing, where possible, the various international drug-control plans and programmes being implemented by the United Nations to ensure greater efficacy and effectiveness in combating the drug menace. In this regard we fully support recent resolutions of the General Assembly calling for an integrated approach in implementing the United Nations International Drug Control Programme. National and regional drug-law enforcement agencies and programmes would, within the context of their drug-enforcement master plans, be able to develop strong links with the United Nations drug-control system in order to enhance their focus in handling the drug problem.

It is our hope that the conclusions and recommendations emanating from these meetings will reinforce our commitment to the active observance of the United Nations Decade against Drug Abuse as well as strengthen our resolve to ensure our collective adherence to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which should continue to serve as the basis of international efforts to combat abuse and illicit drug trafficking.

The PRESIDENT: I now call upon Mr. Anicetas Simutis, Permanent Representative of Lithuania.

Mr. SIMUTIS (Lithuania): The problems associated with drug abuse and illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances transcend national borders and are thus global in dimension. Under the Soviet regime, drug abuse was not an issue of concern, and its existence was even denied. Today, the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and my own country, Lithuania, are increasingly aware of the adverse consequences of the drug problem and of the need for a comprehensive approach in combating this scourge.

The United Nations has an important role to play in the international struggle against drugs. Our Governments note with satisfaction that the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) has since 1992 sent several missions to the Baltic States and is carrying out scientific and technical assistance projects in the laboratory and law enforcement sectors. UNDCP is assisting us in acquiring the defences necessary to address drug-control matters, since our lack of resources and expertise in this area makes us extremely vulnerable at this early stage. To fill the vacuum, interministerial committees have been formed to plan national drug strategies, coordinate implementation and assure full utilization of limited available resources.

The Baltic States are at present pursuing the following national objectives: We are adopting measures that will enable us to comply with the provisions of the drug Conventions while completing the comprehensive legislation needed for ratification. UNDCP has provided

legal assistance in drafting new drug-control laws and in adapting our national legislation to international drug Conventions and decisions dealing with drug abuse and illicit trafficking.

We are increasing our expertise, technical capacities and coordination to enhance our drug-management régime. We require more assistance in meeting our legitimate need for drugs in general, and narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in particular, and in reducing to a minimum drug abuse and such related public-health problems as the increased risk of HIV-AIDS infection from drug injection.

We are working with the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Nordic Committee on Narcotic Drugs, the Pompidou Group of the Council of Europe, the World Health Organization and the European Community PHARE Programme in developing a coherent regional strategy in dealing with traffickers using the Baltic States as transit countries for the transportation of narcotic drugs to consumer markets.

We are seeking recommendations for dealing with problem areas and cultivating more effective enforcement methods and cooperation between drug-enforcement agencies and States and, in particular, between police and customs officials.

We are implementing programmes aimed at strengthening our judicial, legal and law-enforcement systems, with special attention to the training of personnel.

In close consultation with multilateral agencies and bilateral partners, we are developing national, regional, subregional and global drug-control strategies.

We are encouraging grass-roots initiatives and programmes and the involvement of non-governmental organizations in the treatment, rehabilitation and social reintegration of drug abusers. In this regard, we welcome UNDCP's initiative to involve non-governmental organizations, the private sector, schools and the sports community more actively in the campaign against drugs.

We are creating and strengthening our control and monitoring systems for licit drugs and enhancing measures for surveillance of the diversion of precursor chemicals to illicit production.

Because of the use of cheap and easily available substances, such as volatile solvents - glue in particular - we are increasing drug-education programmes, with the goal of promoting healthy-lifestyle programmes among the young.

The post-cold-war era has brought with it many problems and challenges resulting from the social, economic and political transformation under way in our region of the world. Because of severe economic difficulties, there is an acute shortage of appropriate equipment in our laboratories, inhibiting our ability to analyse seized drugs.

With the establishment of fully convertible currencies in the Baltic States, money laundering is another growing problem and a threat to monetary stability. This phenomenon is closely linked to organized crime, a problem of great concern to our Governments and one that needs to be addressed with equal determination.

The Governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will continue to support UNDCP's important coordinating function in the world-wide campaign against drug abuse. Because of the sophisticated and international nature of drug crime, we believe that coordinated action, based on the recommendations made under the Global Programme of Action, is needed to tackle this issue on the global front. We expect the United Nations will continue to play a leading role in the fight against illicit narcotic drugs, and we are ready to contribute our share to the reduction of this problem.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Senegal.

Mr. CISSÉ (Senegal) *(interpretation from French)*: The head of the Senegalese delegation has already had the opportunity to congratulate you, Sir, on your illustrious election to the presidency of the Assembly at this session, and I personally welcome your election because of your outstanding qualities and talent as a diplomat.

The consideration of agenda item 112, in which we are now engaged, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 47/99 of 16 December 1992, affords us an opportunity to evaluate the struggle against narcotic drugs and ponder ways and means of enhancing international cooperation in this sphere. For this reason I have no doubt that this debate will yield concrete proposals.

Indeed, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs is so extensive that nothing short of well-coordinated international action can make a real contribution to its eradication. The threat of such a scourge hovering over our youth - and, hence, over the future of the world - requires that increased attention be given this problem.

It should be added that most of the victims of this dangerous scourge that is spreading unabated are found among the most disadvantaged, for the simple reason that

they are the most vulnerable. This is because there is a direct correlation between the continued deterioration of terms of trade - resulting in a dizzying drop in commodity prices - and an ever-growing trend towards the development of illicit drug crops that promise exorbitant income and exercise an almost irresistible attraction on the people - generally disadvantaged - of the zones of production. This, in fact, explains why the majority of areas under cultivation are found in poor countries.

The Senegalese delegation is of the view that restoring balance to the world economy is one of the indispensable conditions for achieving success in the international community's fight against this scourge. To that end we should, essentially, put an end to economic disparities, which, as they continue to increase, create social inequalities that drug traffickers will surely exploit in unloading more easily their dangerous and harmful products.

It is a great challenge, but there is reason for optimism, especially when we consider the results achieved by the international community and the welcome decision of the International Monetary Fund to include the problem of drugs on its list of five world priorities. These efforts should be strengthened so as to foster among the producing countries policies to encourage, promote and popularize intensive substitute crops and the establishment of a remunerative price-setting system.

The international community's fight against drug abuse will not be effective unless Member States adhere to or ratify and effectively implement the relevant international Conventions. My delegation appeals to States that have not yet done so to take such action. In this way they would show their determination to check and then eradicate this scourge, while also presenting a deterrent to those who, for personal gain, would like to see it perpetuated.

The scope of the phenomenon and its grave social consequences fully justify waging the struggle at the regional and subregional levels also. In this regard, the signing of regional and subregional agreements and the regular organizing of seminars under the aegis of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) would be important steps in support of the Global Programme of Action to combat drug abuse. The seminars being held in various regions - Asia, Central America, the Near East and Africa - and the determination of the States involved to eliminate this scourge are encouraging. However, their conclusions should lead to better follow-up and to concrete action.

Africa is now the drug traffickers' continent of choice for the transit of their merchandise, as most African countries are not equipped to combat this activity. The traffickers benefit not only from this unintentional collusion, but also use more and more sophisticated methods of smuggling the desired quantities.

Thus it is urgently necessary to intensify international cooperation in the provision of assistance to developing countries in general - and to Africa in particular - if they are to have effective and efficient equipment, at their airports and in the administrative bodies concerned.

In addition to this lack of resources, Africa lacks harmonization of legislation for the fight against drugs. Progress has been made in this regard, but not enough. Up to last March nine of the 16 countries in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had ratified the Conventions of 1961, 1971, and 1988 to combat illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs. Only two of the 11 States members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have so far ratified them. It should be pointed out also that only 11 of all the countries in those two subregional organizations have carried out all the formalities, eight of them having ratified only one or two of the Conventions, while eight are still not involved at all.

Unfortunately, this situation benefits drug traffickers, especially as, even in most of the States parties to the Conventions, legislation - if it exists at all - is often incomplete, or even obsolete. Thus, cracking down on theoretically illegal acts is often almost impossible for lack of a legal basis.

At a very early stage Senegal realized the dangers inherent in the phenomenon of drug abuse. In 1963 - 30 years ago - it adopted legislation, which is regularly amended to take account of changing circumstances. In certain cases, Senegalese law provides for sanctions, such as the withdrawal of passports for periods of up to six years, in addition to prison sentences. Above and beyond the traditional law-enforcement structures, Senegal has set up a national commission on narcotic drugs, which plays a dynamic role in both prevention and education, especially through an annual national week to combat drug abuse, whose objective is to heighten public awareness.

I should also refer to the fact that since July 1991 Senegal has had a central office for the prevention of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs. In addition to its law-enforcement function, this office is responsible for centralizing information and for coordinating and encouraging all measures to fight drug trafficking.

I should like to conclude by emphasizing the need to harmonize national legislation so as to provide better monitoring of the licit drug market, and thus to create a more effective system of preventing and eliminating illicit trafficking, and also to encourage all States to ratify the three Conventions I have mentioned.

It is also absolutely necessary to strengthen subregional and regional cooperation, through the establishment of technical structures to wage the struggle at these two levels. More sustained and intensified international cooperation to provide logistical assistance to developing countries and practical measures against the laundering of drug money are fundamental to effective action to combat drug trafficking.

This major challenge should be taken up most energetically, for drugs are the worst enemy of mankind, destroying its basis and all our efforts to build a world of peace and security. Man is both the protagonist and the beneficiary of development, and he must be protected against any scourge that might destroy his mental faculties, his creative imagination and his other talents.

Our young people, whom we have a duty to protect, educate and guide along the path of progress, are also a resource, vulnerable to devastation by this social scourge, if we are not careful.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Kenya.

Mr. MUTHAURA (Kenya): I wish to make a few comments on this important topic of international cooperation against the illicit production, sale, demand, traffic and distribution of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

The drug menace has brought untold suffering to mankind. We support the measures that have been put in place by the international community - ranging from the Political Declaration adopted by the General Assembly at its seventeenth special session to the Global Programme of Action, which contains a comprehensive list of measures and activities.

By its nature, the drug menace cannot be tackled without the concerted efforts of the international community. Over and above the global efforts to reduce the production and supply of, and the demand for, illicit drugs, efforts at the national and regional levels must be intensified. It is therefore imperative that Governments establish comprehensive global measures to fight all aspects of the illicit drugs business.

The restructuring and strengthening of the United Nations machinery in the field of the International Drug Control Programme is a clear demonstration of the General Assembly's intention to maintain an intensified fight to eliminate the illicit production and supply of, and demand for, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Three years after the launching of the Programme, it is now time for the international community to evaluate its success. In this regard, I wish to comment on three important areas.

First, the training component of the programme is one area with great potential for achieving the desired results. My country is one of those that have benefitted from the courses organized by the Programme. We have benefitted also from some bilateral training programmes, including those organized by the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Kenya - and, indeed, many other developing countries - will need more such facilities to strengthen their law-enforcement capacity in this field. Many developing countries also need help to obtain access to improved technologies for surveillance of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Secondly, the drug menace is particularly devastating to the youth who tend to be easy victims. The need to establish facilities for treatment, rehabilitation and social integration of drug and substance abusers can therefore not be overemphasized, especially taking into account the compounding complications that arise as a result of the deadly human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and the immunity deficiency that is associated with it. It is therefore imperative that public education programmes be mounted so as to sensitize the general populace to the inherent dangers of drug abuse. International cooperation in this endeavour therefore cannot be overemphasized.

Thirdly, Governments must agree on decisive measures to curb and control the easy access to and marketing of conventional weapons. My delegation is of the view that easy and uncontrolled access to arms and explosives has made it easy for drug traffickers and warlords to evade the law enforcement agencies. In the process they have caused loss of life to many innocent people and also posed a serious threat to the security and stability of a number of countries. The experience of Colombia should serve as a major challenge to the international community in this regard.

I wish to assure the Assembly of my Government's commitment to the United Nations System-Wide Action Plan on Drug Abuse Control. My country was one of the first countries to sign and ratify the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. At the national level the Kenya Government has embarked on comprehensive legislation on

the control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances which will be debated and enacted by the National Assembly in the very near future. This legislation, among other things, aims at harmonizing national laws and regulations with a view to eliminating the drug market as well as the illicit trafficking of drugs through Kenya by imposing stricter penalties on offenders. It will also introduce measures intended to eradicate the laundering of monies made through the illicit trade in such drugs and substances.

Finally, although the magnitude and scale of the drug menace is still minimal in my country, Kenya is increasingly being used as a transit point especially from the Asian and southern African regions to the European and American markets. This is not surprising because Nairobi is one of the busiest connecting airports in the African continent. The Kenya Government is, however, determined to do everything possible to eradicate transit possibilities through Nairobi International Airport. With the cooperation of the international community we are convinced that we will succeed in this endeavour.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on General Fouad Al-Saleh, Under-Secretary, Ministry of the Interior of Kuwait.

Mr. AL-SALEH (Kuwait) *(interpretation from Arabic):* Allow me at the outset to thank and congratulate the Secretariat of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) on its marvelous efforts in preparing the documentation and drawing up of the reports now before us.

The problems that beset the world nowadays because of the drug trade and the attendant problems of addiction that take considerable segments of the populace out of the productive mainstream of society, side by side with the link between trafficking and criminal activities of every sort, create a serious situation that calls for concerted international efforts and continuous exchanges of information and know-how between States in the war on this illicit trade.

Accordingly, the United Nations system has continued to organize periodic meetings at the international and regional levels with a view to ensuring the required inter-State cooperation and coordination in that area.

In this connection, I should like to pay tribute to the UNDCP secretariat with regard to documentation on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the provision of full information that makes it easy to understand and implement the stipulations of the Convention.

The State of Kuwait has often expressed its keen interest in dealing with this scourge and has shown that interest in a number of ways by participating in international drug-combating conferences and by cooperating with the competent international bodies such as INTERPOL, the Council of Interior Ministers of Arab States and the Arab Centre of Security Studies and Training in attempting to coordinate and strengthen our efforts along those lines.

Kuwait has acceded to the 1988 United Nations Convention. The competent authorities are now seeking to ratify the Convention at the earliest. We have also concluded bilateral agreements with several countries with the aim of combating trafficking and exchanging information.

At the national level, we have enacted the necessary legislation to combat drug abuse and trafficking. For instance, we promulgated a relevant law in 1983 and another in 1987. Our efforts, however, have not been confined to legislating against drugs. We have set up a national commission at a very high level presided over by the Minister of the Interior with the membership of eminent scientists and field specialists to formulate our overall policy against this scourge and to periodically take stock of the effectiveness of such policy.

In trying to cope with problems associated with drug abuse and drug trafficking and in view of the increase in drug trafficking all along our land borders with Iraq, we have begun to dig a trench and to build a sand wall along our entire frontier with Iraq for a number of security reasons and also to stem the flow of drugs from that particular country, which is causing destabilization and threatening the moral fibre of those who succumb to drug addiction.

The delegation of Kuwait attaches great hopes to the activities of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, especially in the area of training, and thanks it for the information it provides. We wish to offer the following suggestions while urging the Programme Director to give a higher priority to the training of personnel engaged in the enforcement of anti-drug laws:

First, the training programmes UNDCP provides should be expanded and better coordinated with relevant regional international organizations.

Secondly, training programmes set up by UNDCP must be scrutinized annually so as to assess their results and develop them according to the findings of such assessment.

Thirdly, the provision of the technical assistance sought from UNDCP by Member States should be linked to the assessment carried out in the annual review process already mentioned, in all areas relating to those States' drug-combating activities.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the Permanent Representative of Kyrgyzstan.

Mr. ATABEKOV (Kyrgyzstan) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: For me this is an extraordinary opportunity most cordially to congratulate you, Sir, most warmly on your election to the presidency of the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session. A month has gone by since you took up that historic gavel in your hands and in that time you have convincingly demonstrated that the presidency is indeed in the firm hands of an extraordinarily able international diplomat. My delegation rests assured that under your skilful guidance this session cannot fail to achieve major success that will lead us to a bright new horizon.

We consider this a fitting opportunity to express before this Assembly our humble views on the complex and painful issue of illicit international drug trafficking, under the agenda item on international control of drugs. Our concerns have been made explicit in the statements of representative of the Commonwealth of Independent States and other representatives. The central idea expressed by all is, in our view, quite clear: how and by what bilateral or multilateral means can we win the battle against this intercontinental scourge?

The international community is following the drug issue very closely. This emerges clearly from the report (A/48/329) of the Secretary-General and from this debate. From the report we see that the "infection" of drug abuse has spread vertically through almost all international structures, which to date have been trying in vain to fight against it. The report presents in painstaking detail the many steps that have been taken in this regard within the United Nations system, both organization-wide and on a narrower scale. We are left with the impression that after so much work and so much intellectual, human and, of course, financial effort, significant results should have been reached. If that is not the case, the far-reaching effects of this illness and the extent of its poisonous spread through societies have been confirmed.

Because of our Organization's precarious financial state, we think it is now essential to weigh the expenditures to which I have referred against the results that have been obtained. An analysis would yield fresh insights as to how to proceed. We wish to stress that our proposal would be valid only in the absence of such an analysis.

The Kyrgyz Republic also suffers from this disease, and it compels us to expend considerable effort on confronting many specific problems. The scale of drug trafficking is cause for concern, while the criminality associated with drug use and the number of drug addicts is alarming.

For a very long time, opium poppies were cultivated in Kyrgyzstan, and this became a favourite literary and cinematic theme in our society, like some others. This phenomenon refused to go away, despite the fact that since 1973 the planting of poppy in Kyrgyzstan had been completely banned. Recently, when democracy and independence were established in Kyrgyzstan, it was forced to mount a stern resistance to active movements, even in Parliament, to resume the planting of poppy. Proponents of this movement argued that our Republic would thus save sufficient capital in foreign currency to solve other economic problems. However, after carrying out a full, in-depth analysis of the possible consequences of such a step, being aware of the dangerous experiences of many other countries, and acting in accordance with the relevant international Conventions on the issue, President Askar Akaev rejected any notion of resuming the planting of poppy, despite the difficulties our Republic would have to face. This reasoned, courageous and prudent action is deserving of great admiration.

Year after year, the Kyrgyz Republic wages a struggle to prevent the exploitation of vast expanses of wild cannabis and other narcotic-containing crops.

But, in addition to domestic factors, there are also external ones. Poor control of borders - indeed, the complete absence of such control in some parts of our region - cannot but contribute to the unchecked spread of raw opium originating in neighbouring territories. Unfortunately, poverty, hunger and the economic and geographic isolation of such areas and their peoples make trafficking in opium the only form of subsistence available to them. All sectors of the population, including women with many children, are at times involved in drug trafficking.

According to available data, the volume of drugs involved in illegal trafficking is growing, with the opening of the new Khorog-Osh route for transshipment to the other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. It is no wonder, then, that drug trafficking in those areas appears to be a permanent feature. There is a very strong temptation to become involved in it, particularly for the most vulnerable sectors of society. In the case of some

neighbouring countries, for example, on the basis of data we have obtained, an investment of one ruble in the production of opium poppies yields an income of 1,242 rubles. Other data indicate that annual exports from that zone total almost 200 tons of raw opium and that at this very time tons of it are ready for export to the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Clearly, the border services have no tranquillity to look forward to. There is also the probability that Kyrgyzstan will gradually become another transit point for moving drugs from the countries of the so-called Golden Crescent to Europe.

In these circumstances, our Government is taking the steps it deems appropriate. Aware of the still graver consequences of trafficking in and illegal use of narcotics if appropriate steps are not taken, and with the aim of cooperating in solidarity with the international community in the effort to solve the problem of drug abuse, the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic intends to ratify at its current autumn session the United Nations international Conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988.

By presidential decree, the State Commission responsible for drug control and attached to the Government has already been created, and the Kyrgyz organization affiliated with the international association for the battle against drug abuse and drug traffic is now in operation. In addition, Kyrgyzstan is already participating in the anti-drug activities of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Finally, it is clear that what is happening in the world of drug trafficking is of concern to our country. We have taken certain steps in this regard, but it seems to us there is still a long and difficult road ahead. As a newly independent country that subscribes to the principles of democracy, market economy, the protection of human rights and the secular State, Kyrgyzstan is ready to cooperate internationally to the extent it can to free our societies of drug abuse, while hoping that the international community will want to help us in our endeavours in this area.

We are genuine and sincere members of the international community. We share all its concerns and problems, and we stand with it in resolute solidarity in its struggle to find solutions. We long for that happy day when free and democratic mankind will at last have eliminated the scourge of drugs.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on Mr. Abdul-Hai Elahi, Minister of State and President of the High Commission for Drug Control of Afghanistan.

Mr. ELAHI (Afghanistan): I am pleased to have the opportunity to participate in these high-level meetings of the plenary of the United Nations General Assembly. I intend to bring to the attention of the General Assembly the strategy that the Islamic State of Afghanistan has adopted in the struggle against the cultivation, stockpiling and trafficking of illicit drugs.

I would begin by assuring you, Mr. President, and representatives, as well as the relevant United Nations offices, of the full awareness of the Islamic State of Afghanistan of the destructive impact on and consequences for the individual of the illegal use of narcotic drugs on the social, national, regional and international levels.

Until recently, many types of narcotic drugs, including heroin, were unheard of in our country. However, the 14 years of war against the former Soviet Union's aggression in Afghanistan, which caused millions of Afghans to leave their homeland, were a factor in leading some of our youth into becoming involved with these physically and mentally ruinous addictions. In addition, the consequences of that war - lawlessness and the lack of a central Government - left our frontiers porous and vulnerable in the face of the international smugglers' network, who, taking advantage of the poverty resulting from the war and the flaws in the rule of law and order, induced the farmers to grow poppies. As a result, this deadly phenomenon spread its shadow on some parts of our society.

It must be mentioned, however, that the figures reported by the international mass media relating to the amount of narcotic drugs being exported from Afghanistan seem to be exaggerated. It must also be noted that within Afghanistan there are no laboratories to process opium into heroin, nor do any conduits or staging areas for exporting narcotics exist.

The production and export of illicit drugs from Afghanistan is incompatible with the national reputation that the Afghan nation gained as a result of its 14 years of victorious struggle against foreign aggression. Moreover, illicit drugs are the source of calamities that threaten the well-being of human societies. The Islamic State of Afghanistan, therefore, has adopted a strong and effective policy to combat illicit drugs. To organize its struggle against this great catastrophe, the High Commission for control of production, smuggling and abuse of drugs was established four months ago under the patronage of the office of the President.

Seventeen executive branches of the Government actively participate in this Commission, which consists of eight subcommittees. It has the responsibility of mobilizing all available national resources in Afghanistan,

including young people, intellectuals, writers, journalists, lawyers, religious scholars, artists and so on in the fight against illicit drugs. The Commission further intends to coordinate its activities with similar regional and international institutions. The High Commission is resolutely dedicated to expanding its struggle to other areas of Afghan life such as the health, social, cultural and legal spheres.

The High Commission, within a very short span of time, and despite extremely limited resources, was able to accomplish the following: first, the adoption of a national policy on combating illicit drugs and the introduction of this policy to other executive branches of the Government for implementation; second, the expansion of its structure and composition for the purpose of increased effectiveness; third, the preparation of plans of action and practical initiatives in conformity with the provisions of the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 26 June 1993, including the publication of a plan of action with a view to its enforcement and implementation by the Government and by the Afghan people; fourth, plans for the establishment of mental- health clinics and special institutions for drug addicts; fifth, the establishment of local commissions against illicit drugs in 31 provinces under the supervision of the Governors; sixth, the preparation of videotaped materials and posters, extensive press campaigns and radio and television programmes; seventh, the destruction of poppy fields covering an area of 82 hectares; eighth, the arrest and prosecution of 58 suspected criminals involved in drug production and trafficking; ninth, the confiscation and destruction of 286 kilograms of heroin, 1,672 kilograms of opium and 521 kilograms of cannabis; and, tenth, the preparation and drafting of a master plan consisting of four specific projects in the field of drug-abuse control.

Afghanistan is committed to observing the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and other pertinent international Treaties. We are in great need of the assistance of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme in preparing the favourable ground that will enable us to effectively work towards the realization of our commitments.

The President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, sent on 5 August 1993 a comprehensive message regarding this highly important matter to the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who responded to the President of Afghanistan by his very positive message of 28 September 1993. Both texts contain important elements and provisions for an effective anti-drug campaign in Afghanistan.

The Government of Afghanistan, having studied the Memorandum of Understanding between Iran, Pakistan and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), has agreed to adhere to it. We are ready to cooperate, in all fields of drug control, with Iran, Pakistan and our Central Asian neighbours. Such cooperation is the main condition for success in the anti-drug efforts in the region.

The Afghan authorities have adopted a national-strategy plan of action against drugs. This is to be implemented through pertinent projects and programmes. However, as our resources for post-war economic reconstruction and revitalization are extremely scarce, we shall be able to fund the plan only if we receive financial assistance from the United Nations and the international community.

If it is to have a comprehensive strategy on research and statistical records, if it is to keep track of patients, if it is provide drug addicts with medical treatment and rehabilitation, Afghanistan will require funding. We need a major campaign in public relations and information to heighten public awareness. All of this demands financial and technical preparation. Special teams are to be trained and mobilized for the purpose of manning observation posts that are to be constructed in border regions and along highways, as well as the mobile law-enforcement units that are to be formed and activated. These are some of the main projects for whose realization we shall certainly need international financial and technical assistance. We could derive highly valuable information from the experience of other nations in this field.

Our strategic plan also aims at the implementation of income-substitution programmes. One of the basic steps taken by the Islamic State of Afghanistan is replacement of poppy cultivation with the cultivation of useful plants. Farmers need financial assistance if they are to cease poppy cultivation, if they are to convert from illicit activity to legal agricultural production. In fact, tackling poverty and unemployment is a prerequisite for the struggle against the production and use of narcotic drugs. We therefore need the help of the United Nations and of the donor countries and institutions.

Training for technical personnel involved in implementation of the anti-drug plans at various stages of our endeavours is another field in which we need international assistance.

Afghanistan's 10-year master plan for its struggle against illicit drugs consists of four basic projects. The financial implications amount to at least $580 million. We should therefore welcome, as a first, urgent step, the

appointment of a United Nations mission to spend a few weeks in Afghanistan studying and assessing the country's anti-drug plans. Subsequently, an office of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme would have to be established in Kabul. With an improvement in the security situation in Afghanistan, illegal activity - including the production, trafficking and consumption of narcotic drugs - will decrease substantially. The convening of an Islamic National Assembly, through which our people will elect the future Head of State and Government, will enable Afghanistan to transform armed confrontation into political competition. The attainment of normality and political consolidation will certainly enable us to pursue our struggle against narcotic drugs in a more efficient and effective manner.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the Permanent Representative of Morocco.

Mr. SNOUSSI (Morocco) *(interpretation from French):* I should like, at the outset, to join those representatives who have congratulated you, Mr. President, on the outstanding manner in which you have been conducting these high-level plenary meetings on drugs.

As has been said by a number of delegations, the drug problem is sparing no country - whether industrialized or developing; whether of the North or the South, whether Eastern or Western. One finds everywhere the same quantitative and qualitative worsening of the situation, with increases in drug trafficking, in the extent of abuse and in the number of abusers, and with the advent of new products or of more powerful derivatives of substances that have been around for a long time. Beyond that, no one can doubt that trafficking in narcotic drugs is at the root of social scourges of many kinds, including organized crime, the corruption of State structures, international terrorism and illegal commercial and financial activity. And, of course, we must not forget about the terrible impact of all this on individuals. I refer, in particular, to complications arising from infections such as AIDS.

Furthermore, drug trafficking is a major handicap in the field of socio-economic development, as it impairs the productivity of individuals, distorts the rules of the game in the economy, and puts an awful burden on the institutions providing medical care and social security. At the same time, it reduces the stability and jeopardizes the security - indeed, the very sovereignty - of States.

On the other hand, it appears that the policies adopted and the means employed for the purpose of coping with these phenomena are largely inadequate and are failing to check the problem. Indeed, notwithstanding the efforts that have been made, the demand for and supply of drugs continue to be a major problem.

The Kingdom of Morocco, convinced of the importance of international cooperation, became a party to the major Conventions on this problem at an early stage. At the regional level, it has participated actively in the work of a variety of symposia and gatherings - Arab, African and Islamic - that have become involved in various ramifications of the illegal trafficking in and the abuse of drugs. Moreover, it has entered into bilateral agreements with numerous countries - notably, the States members of the European Community and the United States of America.

Our law enforcement agencies - in particular, the national police force, the royal gendarmerie, the auxiliary forces, the customs service and the tobacco bureau - have been restructured with a view to the formation of units with special expertise in fighting drugs.

With respect to crop conversion and substitution, activities are under way to reduce the scope of drug abuse through the launching in 1989 of an integrated pilot project on conversion of cannabis cultivation and through public-information and prevention programmes. Moreover, we have established care centres in several provinces and have opened a pilot reception and orientation centre for addicts and their families.

Once again, I thank all the organizations that have been good enough to support our efforts, especially the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) and the European Economic Community.

Those activities constitute, it is true, a major step in the struggle against the production, traffic and abuse of drugs. But, unfortunately, the data show that, despite the achievement of notable results, our goal is still beyond our grasp.

Firmly committed to the process of bolstering political, economic and social freedom, Morocco could not remain indifferent to this grave, growing problem. Hence, in 1992, His Majesty King Hassan II, with his keen understanding of the problem and of the importance of the stakes, issued a series of royal directives to intensify the combat against drugs and continue it unflaggingly.

On the occasion of the Edinburgh summit of the European Community, King Hassan II addressed a letter to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. John Major, then President of the European Community, in which he unambiguously set out the position of Morocco's position, while stressing the complexity of the problem, the

close connection between supply and demand, and the need for increased cooperation, particularly with the countries concerned, to put an end to this scourge that is eating into contemporary society.

At the December 1992 meeting of the Trevi Group, the Minister of the Interior and Information of the Kingdom of Morocco presented our Government's five-year programme for the northern provinces of our country. It is an integrated development programme. In recent months, royal decrees have given rise to many other initiatives as well.

In the legislative and legal sphere, we ratified the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. We then took immediate action to amend and revise Moroccan legislation and bring it into line with the provisions of the Convention. Other provisions have been enacted to stiffen penalties against all drug traffickers.

There have been great strides in law enforcement on the part of the criminal investigation department, the royal police, the customs service and the tobacco bureau. Detailed plans have been put into effect, making use of considerable human and material resources, for close surveillance of drug trafficking, especially on the borders, where a mechanism has been set up to cover the entire Mediterranean coast.

Along with legislative efforts and our fight against drug sales, we have begun to strengthen our social and public health activities. For example, for several months we have been carrying out a broad preventive education campaign aimed at individuals who have special connections with the young or who can have a positive impact with respect to lowering the demand for drugs, such as parents, teachers, doctors, pharmacists and magistrates. In October 1992, my country hosted the first Maghreb training course on drug abuse, for health professionals and other practitioners in the area of social welfare.

We support action by non-governmental organizations and promote the inclusion of drug-related themes in the activities of charitable organizations in the cultural, sporting and scientific spheres. The first Moroccan anti-drug association was founded in May 1992 with the primary objective of reducing the demand for narcotic drugs.

We are doing everything possible to implement all the elements of the Global Programme of Action.

We shall continue our fight, our study and our analysis in order to understand this serious problem better. But it is already clear that we are dealing with a complex problem with many elements that can be approached only in a comprehensive way in the framework of concerted international action.

The line between producer and consumer countries is growing ever more blurred. Traditional producer countries are increasingly consuming all manner of drugs, and some traditional consumer countries are increasingly producing a great variety of drugs and of licit psychotropic substances that are being diverted to illicit use. Production is linked to underdevelopment; it is not enough to promote substitute crops if there is no market outlet for these or if they are unprofitable.

Implementing and strengthening anti-addiction activities require that both producer and transit countries - the majority of them developing countries - make great efforts that interfere with the development strategies and policies that are so vital for raising the often precarious living standards of their peoples. The economic situation of those countries must be taken into serious consideration in the context of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

We have barely reached the mid-way point of the United Nations Decade against Drug Abuse. We have achieved some results, and we have encountered new problems. This will be a long-term battle, in which victory will depend largely on the political will of States and on international solidarity.

Morocco is convinced that the fight against drugs is essentially the responsibility of each country, and will pursue its national efforts, always aiming to find the most appropriate solutions. We also understand the collective responsibility in this realm and the importance of international cooperation in the fight against demand and production of and trafficking in drugs; Morocco is ready and eager to expand its cooperation with other countries.

In our view, the United Nations system, in particular the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and UNDCP, is the proper and the authoritative framework for any global policy to wage war on drugs at the national, regional and international levels. We salute the considerable efforts made by UNDCP, sparked by its Executive Director, Mr. Giacomelli. We hope the potential and operational resources of the United Nations system will be strengthened, especially with an influx of the resources necessary for successful action.

The public at large, people directly affected by this scourge and, especially, the parents of drug addicts are often confused and are demanding quick solutions. They

are questioning the policies of Governments and international organizations.

I wish to conclude by unequivocally stating the firm political will of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco to continue to fight this scourge, and by appealing to the organs of the United Nations system and to regional institutions, in particular the Commission of the European Economic Community, to join and continue their association with our efforts in this sphere.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on Mr. Vladimir Tonkovic, Assistant Minister o Health of Croatia.

Mr. TONKOVIC (Croatia): In my country, the Republic of Croatia, we are deeply concerned and alarmed that the illicit production, trafficking and abuse of narcotics and psychotropic substances are increasing every day and that these illicit activities are claiming a growing number of victims in my country and all over the world.

All of us here today are responsible for the future of the world community and for the welfare of our children, our young people and all human beings. We have to work together and develop measures to strengthen international cooperation against the illicit production, sale, demand, trafficking and distribution of narcotics and psychotropic substances. Related activities are also needed. The proposed draft resolution, however, is an important step and must be adopted.

The principle of shared responsibility should always be the guiding principle in our work. We must also emphasize and take into account the experience gained thus far. We have to bear in mind that no one can fight the problem alone because of the growing violence and economic power of the criminal organizations. They have strong cross-border networks that are engaged in the production of drugs and essential chemicals. All of this portends an increase in financial costs for Governments and threatens the economic, social and political structures of the communities affected.

A global, comprehensive and multidisciplinary long-term programme of action is to be followed by future activities in drug abuse and control, taking into account all the possible health, economic, social and political elements.

Action against drug abuse and the illicit trafficking and production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is a high priority of my Government.

All Conventions on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and Conventions on illicit traffic have been ratified and fully implemented in Republic of Croatia.

The Government's Commission on Drug Abuse was established to coordinate the programmes and activities of the Ministries of Health, Justice, Police, Finance, Work and Social Welfare, Education and Foreign Affairs. The Commission is developing a national programme on drug abuse, which will be the general plan for long-term activities. In the Croatian National Programme the importance of international cooperation will be noted, as well as cooperation with non-governmental organizations. Those organizations have tremendous importance for various reasons.

My country has been a victim of aggression. One third of my country is destroyed and devastated by war. The war damage is estimated to amount to about $23 billion. There are nearly 600,000 displaced persons and refugees in Croatia at this very moment. Their care costs Croatia about $62 million per month. This year we have already spent over half a billion dollars for their care. This is significant for an economy of a mere $8 billion.

Mr. Soh (Republic of Korea), Vice-President, took the Chair.

In Croatia 31 health-care facilities, hospitals or health centres have been damaged or destroyed; 16,000 have been disabled or handicapped by the war. The cost of war damage to the health network is over $1 billion. We have already noted that the illicit traffic and distribution of narcotics and psychotropic substances is increasing in Croatia. There is a tremendous need to support the work of the Croatian governmental Commission on drug abuse and the financing of equipment, training programmes and health, social-welfare and education programmes. I appeal to members for such assistance.

The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, and I now call upon him.

Mr. JAAFARI (Syrian Arab Republic) *(interpretation from Arabic):* These high-level plenary meetings of the General Assembly clearly demonstrate that the problem of illicit narcotic drugs has become a world-wide phenomenon that transcends national boundaries and that is of concern to all States, a problem that poses a challenge to the concept of sovereignty, national borders and national legislation. There is therefore a need to strengthen international cooperation in the campaign against this grave problem that is posing such an enormous challenge to efforts being made to achieve development and economic growth throughout the world.

Since the convening of the seventeenth special session of the General Assembly in 1990, which dealt with

international cooperation to combat narcotic drugs, the United Nations has been attempting to coordinate international efforts in this sphere by following the Programme of Action adopted for the control of narcotic drugs under the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), which has underscored the focal role of the United Nations as the centre for directing and coordinating efforts in this sphere.

In facing up to the challenge of the scourge of drugs and the serious economic and social problems it creates, our efforts will be crowned with success only if we adopt an integrated approach that deals with both supply and demand, production, trafficking - including arms trafficking - the control of basic chemical products and money laundering. We would also emphasize in order for such efforts to succeed, they must be based squarely on the principles of the United Nations as set forth in the Political Declaration and Global Programme of Action adopted at the seventeenth special session, which include, *inter alia*, respect for State sovereignty, shared responsibility, non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, strengthening of international cooperation in agreed circumstances and through bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements.

My country has been an active participant, along with the regional, Arab and specialized institutions, in coordinating international efforts to combat the use, production, distribution and trafficking of narcotic drugs and the investment of the income derived from the drug trade in other illicit activities that have an equally serious social and economic impact. My country's cooperation in these efforts is in keeping with the control mechanisms mentioned in the Secretary-General's report on international drug control and with the goals of the United Nations Decade against Drug Abuse 1991-2000.

At the national level, we have promulgated recently Law No. 2, 1993, on drug abuse. That law takes into account the provisions of three United Nations Conventions on drugs and adapts national Syrian legislation to the provisions of international Conventions. In our own region my country participates in monthly meetings of liaison officers in Cyprus, at the invitation of the United States Department of Drug Abuse Control, as well as in meetings of the sub-committee dealing with the illicit traffic in drugs and psychotropic substances in the Near and Middle East.

The President returned to the Chair.

My country is also a party to bilateral conventions on information exchange on drug-trafficking with Cyprus, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon.

At the international level, Syria participates in all international drug combating meetings and conferences, the latest of which was the meeting of the Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies held in Vienna in 1992. Other meetings continuously take place in Syria between the Syrian drug combating agency and the coordinators of drug combating activities in the Western embassies to my country. Syria also participates in the meetings organized by INTERPOL and the United Nations on combating drugs. As a matter of fact Syria has furnished very important information to INTERPOL which enabled that agency to confiscate several tons of hashish and other narcotic drugs over the period from 1991 to 1992.

As I have said, the problem of narcotic drugs has become truly universal without distinction between producer, transit or consumer States. Although Syria is basically a transit State, because of its geographical position between the producer and consumer countries, the political will to combat the transit activities of the drug trade across Syrian territory is strong indeed. As an example of the results of such resolve, 10 tons of hashish have been destroyed in Damascus in the presence of liaison officers from the European Community and the United States. A delegation from the United Nations International Drug Control Programme has visited Syria and Lebanon, at the invitation of the Governments of the two countries, over the period from 15 through 21 May 1992. In the course of its visit, the delegation was informed of the joint operations undertaken by the Lebanese and Syrian authorities to destroy narcotic drugs.

In order for peace to be comprehensive and just, it should be based on solid legal and political foundations. It cannot be established between societies that are at odds with each other, just for the sake of combating drugs. Therefore, the call for regional cooperation and a united front in the war on drugs are matters that should be considered after the establishment of peace in the region, and not before. The continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories is directly responsible for the persistence of social and economic tensions in the region and for the displacement of hundreds of thousands of refugees with all the attendant splitting and dispersal of families and despair of the young who are deprived of hope in a secure decent future.

The Middle East region is, perhaps, more interested than any other region in combating the scourge of drugs as it is a region that has suffered enough already from the economic and social dislocation brought about by the scourge of aggression and the resultant evils of occupation, deprivation and the wasting of development potential and resources that could have been channelled towards the betterment of standards of living of our populations.

There is no doubt that a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict - a process that was begun in Madrid on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 425 (1978) and the principle of returning the occupied Arab territories to their rightful owners in exchange for peace - could put an end to the wasting of the huge resources my country as well as many other Arab countries have been forced to divert to self-defence and the ending of Israeli occupation.

In conclusion, my delegation welcomes the efforts of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme and reaffirms its readiness to cooperate effectively and closely with the Programme's Executive Director, Mr. Giacomelli, because we wish to participate in strengthening the international strategy to combat drug abuse.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on Major-General Abdel Ghani Elrabie, Director of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Ministry of the Interior of Sudan.

Mr. ELRABIE (Sudan) *(interpretation from Arabic)*: Public awareness in Sudan of the evils of drugs has always been deep-rooted and comprehensive. This can be seen in the enactment of the Law against Trafficking in Illicit Goods in 1902 which was the first legislation in Sudan to prohibit the abuse of drugs and which was followed by the Law on Hashish and Opium of 1924, the Law on Pharmaceuticals and Toxic Materials of 1963 and the Law against Illicit Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1993. This was preceded in 1989 by an important amendment of the 1924 Law. The amendment introduced the death penalty for drug trafficking, and stiffened the penalties for other related crimes.

Sudanese society does not suffer as other countries do from the problem of drugs, thanks to its religious and social values, which constitute a true guarantee against drug abuse, particularly amongst the young, who receive broad education on the teachings and values of Islam.

The geographical location of Sudan contributes to the transfer of drugs through its territory as a transit country. Synthetic and other drugs enter Sudan from West Africa across our western borders and from Central Africa across the southern borders. They are then transferred via little-used routes to our Red Sea coast and thence to Europe and the Arab world. Drug-smuggling through Sudan is done by various means and evasive tactics taken by the smugglers to penetrate the lines of our security forces. I should like here to cite a few examples of such methods.

First, passing ships unload their drugs in the waters of the Red Sea near harbours. Those drugs are then picked up and transferred to the coast by specially equipped boats and loaded on trucks and pack animals headed inland. In many instances, we have succeeded in arresting the smugglers. The largest quantity yet intercepted has been 15 tons of hashish.

Secondly, another form of smuggling is carried out by hiding drugs in different types of machinery that are shipped by normal means. We have seized 445,000 psychotropic pills and 3 kilograms of heroin in a bus that was being shipped.

Thirdly, yet another form involves hiding the drugs on the coast to await the passage of ships that are in collusion with the drug smugglers; we have seized 90,000 psychotropic pills in that manner. Fourthly, another form of smuggling consists of storing drugs on some uninhabited island to be later reloaded onto another ship so as to avoid tracking operations, and fifthly, unloading drugs that are very carefully packed in the open sea, hiding them amid coral reefs under water in previously agreed-upon places for later collection by boats.

The coasts of the Red Sea witness a great deal of drug smuggling activity which threatens both North and South, as well as Europe and America in particular. Sudan has participated in all conferences and activities against drug abuse at both the international and regional levels. I had the honour to be the only observer from outside the European Community in the Conference Against Illicit Drugs held at The Hague in the Netherlands in the spring of 1976. We have also attended other conferences in Vienna, Abidjan, Harare and Europe, in support of international efforts aimed at containing the drug problem.

The Sudan has signed all the drug combating conventions including the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Our concern with the issue of drugs has not been confined to the executive institutions. It has been transformed into concrete action by the legislature, as well, and we have recently organized a workshop on the issue to devise a strategy that will enable the Sudan to contain and control the problem.

Our anti-drug strategy is based: Firstly, on preventive information and awareness campaigns aimed at preventing new victims from falling prey to the scourge of drugs. In 1992, we organized 207 lectures for those segments of our society which could be attracted to drug abuse. We have also issued various manuals and booklets and we have prepared anti-drug abuse documentary films.

Secondly, on combating drug smuggling and drug trafficking: we have destroyed 67 tons of hashish cultivated on 120 acres in the region of Radom at the

southern end of the province of Darfur in western Sudan. We have also destroyed 47 tons of hashish in Darfur, and the latest big operation, organized in the area of Reqsham in Darfur in November 1992, led to the destruction of 65 tons of hashish. We have also destroyed many illicit plantations in the Qadaref region of the Sudan. Yet we do not leave simple citizens without a source of income. We have transformed them into growers of licit agricultural produce, providing them with tractors and seeds.

Our anti-drug efforts have been given concrete shape by the establishment of a National Committee against Drugs in 1960, whose membership includes representatives of the police force, the Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary, and the Ministries of Health, Social Welfare, Education and Sports, as well as the University of Khartoum. The Committee, which coordinates efforts, organizes various programmes and formulates plans aimed at increasing public awareness of the dangers and harmful effects of drugs operates under the leadership of Mr. Abaro, the former Director General of the police force. With the National Commission on Medicines, the Committee organizes programmes aimed at controlling the use of licit drugs and ensuring that they are used for medical purposes only. This coordinating operation covers every part of the Sudan and comes as a serious response to the recommendations of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs and in implementation of the many decisions taken by the heads of drug enforcement agencies in Africa, at their Cairo meeting in 1990.

We have taken several initiatives which have had positive returns in the context of our drug combating activities. In 1991, we transformed our Customs and Excise Department into a police force. This has greatly facilitated the exchange of information and promoted coordination and cooperation between our law-enforcement agencies. Strict banking controls have blocked money laundering operations. Drug traffickers are not able to ply their trade in Sudan by the force of arms as we do not allow the possession of arms without permits. We also impose strict controls on governmental and private pharmacies to prevent any possible abuse of psychotropic substances. We also coordinate with the authorities of sister Arab and African countries. In this context, Sudan hosted the drug combating conference for the Arab region in which experts from the United Nations participated. The Sudanese Drug Combating Agency furnishes the United Nations with reports and exchanges information through INTERPOL.

We believe that the United Nations, while conducting peace-keeping operations in the world, should also take concrete initiatives to organize drug-combating campaigns aimed at fighting drugs. Drugs are like wars; both target human beings and their very existence. Drug trafficking is as dangerous as trafficking in arms. We look forward to more substantial support from the United Nations for our efforts. Such support began in 1987, but it has not yet risen to the level of our expectations.

We have received a positive response from the Assistant Secretary-General and the Executive Director of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) during the meetings of the thirty-sixth session of the International Narcotics Control Board in Vienna this April. We appreciate their assistance and appeal to them to help transform our aspirations into concrete actions which will help us in this fight of good against evil and enable us to control, if not completely to eradicate, drug abuse, in order to protect our societies and future generations and guarantee the continuation of civilization on earth until the end of time.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Fiji.

Mr. SENILOLI (Fiji): First, I wish to state that my delegation fully supports the statement made by the representative of the Marshall Islands, who spoke on this issue on behalf of the members of the South Pacific Forum.

In recent years the use of illegal drugs has spread at an unprecedented rate and has reached all corners of the globe. No nation has been free of this devastating problem. The long-term effects of chronic drug abuse and its impact on the user, the family, the community and society have aroused the concern of the world community.

Reasons for this concern include related increases in crime; drug-related automobile accidents; accidents that take place on the job; learning disabilities and other mental health problems; family dislocation and disruption; and health problems, including long-term damage to the brain, heart and lungs.

The General Assembly, recognizing the central role that it must play in fostering concerted international action against illicit drug production, trafficking and consumption, adopted resolution S-17/2 in 1990, by which it approved a Political Declaration and a Global Programme of Action.

The Global Programme of Action outlined activities Governments could undertake to combat drug abuse and trafficking. It also proclaimed the period from 1991 to 2000 as the United Nations Decade against Drug Abuse, to be devoted to effective and sustained national, regional and international actions to promote the implementation of the Global Programme of Action.

The problem of drug abuse and drug trafficking cannot be solved quickly; it will need the cooperation of all States in taking strong measures by enacting appropriate laws and enforcing them.

We in the South Pacific are disturbed by the increasing problem of drug trafficking and drug abuse in the region. The region, because of its great expanse of ocean, many uninhabited islands and weak economic base, is fertile ground for drug traffickers as a staging post for the transmission of their supplies to lucrative markets in Europe and North America.

Fiji, a major tourist destination, port and transit point for air traffic and small craft, is vulnerable and is now probably serving as an important drug trafficking point because of our less sophisticated detection capability, limited financial resources, and lack of adequate equipment and specialized personnel. While illicit drug abuse has not become a major concern, the changing drug scenario is worrying. In recent years, the incidence of drug abuse - especially involving cannabis, which is also grown locally - has increased substantially. The major drug find of 173 kilograms of hashish concealed inside gas tanks and buried in an isolated and uninhabited island was most disturbing. Our law-enforcement authorities have periodically apprehended non-Fiji citizens who were involved in efforts to transport hard drugs, using couriers or unaccompanied packages. A big consignment of cocaine destined for a South Pacific State was discovered some years ago.

As the scourge of drug abuse establishes itself in various communities, the Fiji Government is taking steps to strengthen its preventive measures. The Fiji Police Department has created a National Drugs Enforcement Unit with the mandate of prevention and control, if not elimination, of the importation, production and use of illicit drugs in Fiji. The Unit is vigorously pursuing its work of eliminating illicit plantations of marijuana and they are being given every support by the affected communities.

In order to upgrade the capacity of the regional police on drug matters, Fiji will be seeking the blessing of the South Pacific Police Commissioners' Conference in Papua New Guinea next month to establish regional training at the Fiji Police Academy. We hope that if the recommendation is accepted funds will be available from the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) to complement what will be found locally.

The legislation in force in the field of drug control was recently amended to remove the discretionary powers of magistrates to impose a fine or a suspended sentence. Under the amendment a mandatory custodial sentence of a minimum of a three-month term of imprisonment for possession or use of cannabis must be imposed; this is intended as a deterrent.

Last March the Fiji Government, in support of the efforts of the United Nations on drugs, acceded to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. The Pacific Islands Law Officers Meeting was mandated in 1992 by the South Pacific Forum island leaders, who met in the Solomon Islands, to pursue actively and implement strategies that will satisfy the law-enforcement requirements of the 1988 United Nations Convention on drugs. The Declaration by the South Pacific Forum on Law Enforcement Cooperation, referred to as the Honiara Declaration, has been pursued with some vigour by the Senior Legal Advisers of the Governments of the South Pacific region. Fiji chaired the Committee of Legal Advisers in 1992 to 1993 and has actively participated in assisting countries in our region in three principal areas, namely, a framework of mutual assistance in criminal matters, legislation on the proceeds from crime, and extradition.

We have embarked on a programme of reviewing existing legal frameworks with a view to improving them to satisfy the mandatory requirements of the 1988 United Nations Convention on drugs. At this point, I wish to thank Australia for offering to fund the cost of a suitable legislative drafter, who is to carry out the review of the relevant legislation in the smaller Pacific States.

Money laundering is becoming a serious problem in our region. Given our smallness and the openness of our economies, we are acutely concerned about the negative impact it has on our economies, and we are taking steps to tackle this menace. We in Fiji currently have before Parliament legislation that will criminalize money laundering not only as regards illegal proceeds from the sale of illicit drugs, but to cover all proceeds from criminal activities.

We welcome the report of the UNDCP Mission to the Pacific in November and December 1992. It clearly points out areas which need some attention. My Government welcomes UNDCP's interest in and emphasis on our subregion, and we thank it for its decision to implement the Mission's most urgent recommendations.

Finally, my delegation supports the draft resolution that is before us, which suggests, amongst other things, that these crucial issues which we have discussed at length in these last few days be discussed further in the high-level segment of the Economic and Social Council next year.

The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/48/L.12, entitled "Measures to strengthen international cooperation against the illicit production, sale, demand, traffic and distribution of narcotics and psychotropic substances and related activities".

May I take it that the Assembly decides to adopt draft resolution A/48/L.12 by consensus?

Draft resolution A/48/L.12 was adopted (resolution 48/12).

The PRESIDENT: I should like to express my appreciation and, I believe, that of the entire Assembly to the delegation of Mexico and others that shepherded this resolution to consensus.

The General Assembly has thus concluded its consideration of the status of international cooperation against the illicit production, sale, demand, traffic and distribution of narcotics and psychotropic substances.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.

United Nations
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records

43rd PLENARY MEETING
Friday, 29 October 1993
at 10 a.m.

NEW YORK

President: Mr. INSANALLY
(Guyana)

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 3 *(continued)*

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

(b) FIRST REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (A/48/512)

The PRESIDENT: The draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee in paragraph 12 of its first report (A/48/512) reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the first report of the Credentials Committee and the recommendation contained therein,

"Approves the first report of the Credentials Committee."

We shall now proceed to consider the draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee in its first report.

Before I call on the first speaker in explanation of vote on the recommendation of the Credentials Committee, may I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. SHAHREZA (Islamic Republic of Iran): My delegation wishes to express its reservations regarding paragraph 4 of the first report of the Credentials Committee, document A/48/512, on the credentials of Israel. For this reason, and in line with the position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the issue, my delegation wishes to dissociate itself from the parts of the said report referring to the approval of the credentials of Israel.

Mr. AMER (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) *(interpretation from Arabic)*: At a time when the General Assembly intends to approve the first report of the Credentials Committee, document A/48/512, the approval of my delegation of this report does not mean at all recognition of the credential papers of Israel. Despite the latest developments on the question of Palestine we do not think that this is an overall, comprehensive solution to this question. The solution would be the full recognition of all the rights of the Palestinian people and, especially their rights of return to their homeland, self-determination and the establishment of their own independent State.

The PRESIDENT: We shall now take action on the recommendation of the Credentials Committee contained in paragraph 12 of its first report (A/48/512).

The Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to do the same?

The draft resolution was adopted *(resolution 48/13)*.

The PRESIDENT: We have thus concluded this stage of our consideration of sub-item (b) of agenda item 3.

This record is subject to correction.
Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, Room C-178, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

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AGENDA ITEM 15 *(continued)*

ELECTIONS TO FILL VACANCIES IN PRINCIPAL ORGANS

(a) ELECTION OF FIVE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will now proceed to the election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council to replace those members whose term of office expires on 31 December 1993.

The five non-permanent outgoing members are the following: Cape Verde, Hungary, Japan, Morocco and Venezuela. These five States cannot be re-elected and therefore their names should not appear on the ballot papers.

Apart from the five permanent members, the Security Council will include in 1994 the following States: Brazil, Djibouti, New Zealand, Pakistan and Spain. The names of those States, therefore, should not appear on the ballot papers.

Of the five non-permanent members which will remain in office in 1994 two are from Africa and Asia, one is from Latin America and the Caribbean and two are from the Group of Western European and other States.

Consequently, pursuant to paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 1991 A (XVIII) of 17 December 1963, the five non-permanent members should be elected according to the following pattern: three from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe and one from Latin America and the Caribbean. The ballot papers reflect this pattern.

In accordance with the established practice there is an understanding to the effect that of the three States to be elected from Africa and Asia, two should be from Africa and one from Asia.

I should like to inform the Assembly that the number of candidates, not exceeding the number of seats to be filled, receiving the greatest number of votes and a two-thirds majority of those present and voting will be declared elected.

In the case of a tie vote for a remaining seat, there will be a restricted ballot limited to those candidates which have obtained an equal number of votes.

May I take it that the General Assembly agrees to that procedure?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In accordance with rule 92 of the rules of procedure, the election shall be held by secret ballot, and there shall be no nominations.

Does any Member wish to speak before we proceed to the election?

I now call on the representative of Zimbabwe as Chairman of the Group of African States.

Mr. MUMBENGEGWI (Zimbabwe): Africa has endorsed the candidature of Rwanda from the central Africa region to fill one of the two non-permanent seats in the Security Council to be vacated on 31 December 1993. However, the same cannot be said for the west Africa region. Hence both Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria are candidates to fill the other non-permanent seat in the Security Council to be vacated on 31 December 1993.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Indonesia as Chairman of the Group of Asian States.

Mr. WISNUMURTI (Indonesia): In my capacity as Chairman of the Asian Group for the month of October 1993 I have the honour to inform the Assembly that the Asian Group has endorsed the candidature of the Sultanate of Oman for election to a non-permanent seat in the Security Council.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of the Russian Federation as Chairman of the Group of Eastern European States.

Mr. VORONTSOV (Russian Federation)*(interpretation from Russian):* As Chairman of the Group of Eastern European States for the month of October I have the honour to announce that for the one seat for a non-permanent member of the Security Council allocated to the Group of Eastern European States there are two candidates, Belarus and the Czech Republic.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Cuba as Chairman of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States.

Mr. REMÍREZ DE ESTENOZ (Cuba) *(interpretation from Spanish):* As Chairman of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, I have the honour of informing the General Assembly that the Group supports and endorses Argentina as the single candidate from our

region for the corresponding seat on the Security Council. We commend to the Assembly the candidature of the Republic of Argentina, confident that Argentina will make a valuable contribution to the work of this important organ.

The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the rules of procedure, we shall proceed to the election by secret ballot, taking into account the statements made by the representatives of Zimbabwe, Indonesia, the Russian Federation and Cuba.

Ballot papers marked "A", "B" and "C" will now be distributed.

I request representatives to use only those ballot papers that have been distributed and to write on them the names of the five States for which they wish to vote.

A ballot paper containing the names of more States from the relevant region than the number of seats assigned to it will be declared invalid. Names, on a ballot paper, of Member States that do not belong to that region will not be counted.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Suziedelis (Lithuania), Ms. Jonsvik (Norway) and Mr. Berguido (Panama) acted as tellers.

A vote was taken by secret ballot.

TRIBUTE TO THE MEMORY OF MELCHIOR NDADAYE, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BURUNDI

The PRESIDENT: Before suspending the meeting for the counting of ballots, I propose that the General Assembly pay a tribute to the memory of the late President of the Republic of Burundi, His Excellency Mr. Melchior Ndadaye.

Just over three weeks ago the General Assembly had the honour to hear President Ndadaye's eloquent, thoughtful and profound address. In the course of his statement he informed us that on 1 June 1993 Burundi had held free, open and fair general elections for the first time. He believed that the path of democracy was the only way to resolve the problems of power that affected the Republic.

Last week's attempted military coup against his Government, in which the President was assassinated, was a serious blow to Burundi's progress and a personal shock to all of us who retain very vivid memories of this respected leader.

On behalf of the General Assembly I should like to convey our heartfelt condolences to the Government and the people of Burundi, and to the bereaved family.

I invite representatives to stand and observe a minute of silence in tribute to the memory of the late President of the Republic of Burundi.

The members of the General Assembly observed a minute of silence.

The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Zimbabwe.

Mr. MUMBENGEGWI (Zimbabwe): I should like to begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for the tribute that has been paid at this meeting to the memory of the late President of the Republic of Burundi, His Excellency Mr. Melchior Ndadaye.

Allow me, on behalf of the African Group, to express to our colleagues in the delegation of Burundi and, through them, to the bereaved people of their country our sincere sympathy and condolences on the very untimely death of their President.

We in the African Group received the tragic news of the assassination of President Ndadaye with great shock and personal grief. We had had the singular honour and privilege only three weeks earlier of welcoming President Ndadaye to the United Nations, and I as Chairman of the African Group enjoyed the privilege of presenting him to the Group.

Mrs. Frechette (Canada), Vice-President, took the Chair.

His address to the Group, just like his earlier address to the General Assembly that same morning, was most profound and inspiring.

Brutally murdered in the very prime of his young life and at the pinnacle of his political leadership and statesmanship, President Ndadaye had dedicated his life to the promotion of democracy and the general well-being of his people. He had gained deserved recognition in Africa as a courageous fighter for democratic principles and peaceful cooperation between peoples and nations. It was in recognition of his courage and leadership qualities that, in Burundi's first democratic elections on 1 June this year, the people of Burundi overwhelmingly mandated Mr. Ndadaye to lead the country as President.

The tragedy that has befallen the people of Burundi is enormous. The bloody and senseless attempted coup and

the brutal and despicable assassination of President Ndadaye and other democratically elected national leaders are not only setbacks for democracy, but have also brought the peace-loving people of that country perilously close to the brink of civil war. The highest tribute we could ever pay to the late President, as well as the most fitting solace we could offer the grieving nation of Burundi, would be for the international community to stand solidly behind the people of Burundi as they close ranks at this tragic hour behind the legitimately elected Government to preserve their hard-won democratic gains.

In that regard, we note with appreciation the dispatch by the United Nations Secretary-General of a Special Envoy to Burundi, as well as the efforts of the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity to consult with neighbouring Heads of State on the best way to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Burundi. We also note with appreciation the rapid response of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme and other relief agencies to the humanitarian needs of the people of Burundi.

I should like, therefore, on behalf of the Group of African States, to reiterate our grief and sorrow at this tragic loss and to convey to the bereaved families of the President and the others who lost their lives in this tragedy our deepest sympathy and condolences.

Finally, I wish to thank Mr. Insanally for allowing us this opportunity to share our grief with the people of Burundi over their irreparable loss, and to pay homage to that fine son of Africa, the late President Melchior Ndadaye.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Indonesia, who will speak on behalf of the Asian Group of States.

Mr. WISNUMURTI (Indonesia): I have the sad duty to state, on behalf of the Asian Group of States, that the members of our regional Group have learned with a profound sense of sorrow and grief of the passing of President Melchior Ndadaye.

His untimely death under tragic circumstances has cut short a promising career in the service of his country and of the continent of Africa. From the early years of his life, he saw it as his duty to place himself at the service of his country. Because of his unshakeable faith in freedom, progress, democracy and human rights, he enjoyed the esteem and admiration of his people. He will undoubtedly leave his mark as a man who served his country with devotion and dedication.

On behalf of the Asian Group, I convey to the Government and people of Burundi and the bereaved family, through the intermediary of the Burundi delegation, our sincere condolences.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of the Russian Federation, who will speak on behalf of the Group of Eastern European States.

Mr. VORONTSOV (Russian Federation) *(interpretation from Russian)*: On behalf of the members of the Eastern European Group of States, I would like to pay tribute to the deceased President of Burundi, Mr. Melchior Ndadaye, who fell victim to the military coup against the democratically elected Government of Burundi.

The criminal acts of violence committed by the perpetrators of the coup have been unanimously condemned by the international community.

I ask the delegation of Burundi to convey to the family of the deceased President and the Government and people of Burundi our sincere condolences. It is our sincere hope that democracy and constitutional rule will be promptly restored in Burundi.

The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Cuba, who will speak on behalf of the Latin American and Caribbean Group of States.

Mr. REMÍREZ DE ESTENOZ (Cuba) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: The members of the Latin American and Caribbean Group of States learned with profound sorrow of the death on 21 October of the President of the Republic of Burundi, Mr. Melchior Ndadaye, and of prominent members of his Government as a result of a bloody *coup d'état* in that fraternal African country.

May I today, on behalf of the Latin American and Caribbean Group, express the heartfelt condolences of our members to the people and Government of Burundi, the members of the President's family and all those others who were close to him. We hope that the country can continue along the path freely and in a sovereign manner chosen by its people towards progress, development and well-being.

The PRESIDENT: I next call on the representative of New Zealand, who will speak on behalf of the Group of Western European and Other States.

Mr. KEATING (New Zealand): It was with great sadness and regret that the delegations of the Group of Western European and Other States learned of the tragic death of the President of Burundi, Mr. Melchior Ndadaye.

We recall that just 25 days ago President Ndadaye, the leader of a democratically elected Government, stood before the Assembly at this very podium and offered us his vision of a peaceful and prosperous Burundi. President Ndadaye was a young man, and the vision he offered was a young man's vision, of hope, unity and dignity for all people in his country.

His untimely death, just when real political progress was being made in Burundi, leaves us all with a sense of loss and outrage. We condemn those responsible for the deaths of the President and his compatriots, and we hope that they will be brought to justice.

On behalf of the Group of Western European and Other States, I should like, on this solemn occasion, to convey our most sincere condolences to the bereaved families, to the people and the Government of Burundi, and to our colleagues in the Burundi delegation.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of the United States of America as the host country, Her Excellency Mrs. Madeleine Korbel Albright.

Mrs. ALBRIGHT (United States of America): The United States, as host country, joins the world in condemning the murder of President Ndadaye and other high Government officials. This reprehensible action violates the most fundamental principles of law and morality. We extend our sincere condolences to the late President's wife and family and to the families of all those who were killed or injured, or who have disappeared.

We are shocked and deeply saddened by the violence and mounting casualties in Burundi. We urge all sides to refrain from violence and to respect the authority of the elected Government.

The United States reiterates its demand that those responsible for perpetrating the action against the democratically elected Government of Burundi reveal the whereabouts and fate of all Government officials and others who may have been taken prisoner or who disappeared during this action. We support the Government's right to prosecute to the fullest extent of the law those responsible for murder, rebellion and other offences against the Government and people of Burundi.

We salute the freely elected Government and the people of Burundi, who remain committed to consolidating their country's democracy. The international community is unanimous in its support of Burundi's democratic transition and will condemn any attempt to reverse it.

We are encouraged by the recent signs that the coup attempt is collapsing. Prime Minister Kinigi and other members of the cabinet have taken important measures to reassert control over the country. We applaud the bravery of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and other Government officials who have persevered throughout the crisis and are now working to consolidate the Government's control over the situation.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Burundi, His Excellency Mr. Therénce Sinunguruza, Permanent Representative of Burundi.

Mr. SINUNGURUZA (Burundi) (interpretation from French): The tragic circumstances that so recently brought sorrow to my country lead me to speak today in this forum, where you have just paid a final tribute to a man who, only three weeks ago and from this very rostrum, conveyed to you a message of peace, unity and democracy from the people of Burundi.

I should like in turn to carry out that duty. But before so doing, may I first of all thank most sincerely, on behalf of the people of Burundi, of my Government and on my own behalf, all those who have supported us and continue to support us during the tribulations forced upon us by a military group intent on achieving their own self-interest by any means possible.

Yes, indeed! The Assembly stood together in silence just now to condemn this putsch and the assassination of our President, and the people of Burundi are deeply grateful for this tribute.

I thank most particularly those who spoke on behalf of their organizations and of their Member States for the sympathy and support they expressed to my people, who are going through a very difficult period. I also thank the Security Council for the swiftness with which it reacted to the situation in my country and for its crystal-clear declaration to those who were usurping the sovereignty of our people. We are certain that assistance from the international community will help us quickly to restore peace and stability in Burundi.

The enemies of peace have struck, and they have struck with great force. His Excellency Mr. Melchior Ndadaye was the first President of the Republic of Burundi democratically elected by the people. The Assembly has just paid a final tribute to him, and for this I should like to thank the Members wholeheartedly. His most earnest desire was that the people of Burundi might finally be shielded from ethnic confrontation, so that not one more drop of blood might be shed. But alas, he did not know that the enemies of peace, unity and democracy were going

to begin by shedding his own blood and that this brutal and outrageous act would entail great loss of human life.

By sacrificing himself, he has become a martyr for democracy. "Never again" - the phrase he spoke from this rostrum only 17 days before his tragic passing - will give pause to many peace-loving Burundians for a long time. And today, I say, "Enough of this!" We must finally put an end to the cycle of tragedies which have struck my country.

Indeed, the consequences of this putsch were such that the old demons of division have arisen again just when we thought that they had finally been relegated to the trash heap of history. Ethnic violence is currently ravaging the countryside of Burundi. People are seeking refuge in wretched and unsafe areas, and a great many of them have fled to neighbouring countries. The number of displaced persons and refugees is now estimated at 400,000.

Though irreparable harm has already been done, the international community must now help us put a stop to this carnage. This requires the restoration and protection of the constitutional order resulting from the June elections.

My Government, which is prepared to take things in hand once again, nevertheless requires a minimum of security. Indeed, it can no longer trust its army, which rose up one fine morning to shoot down an innocent President without any apparent reason. That is why the international community must understand the appeal made by my Government for an international force to come to Burundi to ensure the security of political and democratic authorities, to restore peace and security to our population and to help in the return and resettlement of displaced persons and refugees. We have no doubt that this community, already aware of the situation in my country, will not fail to give us its full support.

We also would like to avail ourselves of this opportunity to appeal to all States Members of the United Nations, to international organizations and to non-governmental organizations to lend my country emergency humanitarian assistance for displaced persons and refugees.

His Excellency Mr. Ndadaye has just been assassinated on the battlefield of democracy. He therefore deserves to be called a hero of democracy in Burundi.

For all those who wish to address their written condolences to my people, our Permanent Mission has opened a register for that purpose. To all those who have already done so, I would like to convey my gratitude.

The meeting was suspended at 11.25 a.m. and resumed at 11.50 a.m.

The President returned to the Chair.

The PRESIDENT: The result of the voting for the election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council is as follows:

Group A - African and Asian States

Number of ballot papers:	176
Number of invalid ballots:	0
Number of valid ballots:	176
Abstentions:	0
Number of Members voting:	176
Required two-thirds majority:	118
Number of votes obtained:	
Oman	174
Rwanda	153
Nigeria	99
Guinea-Bissau	82
Burundi	2

Group B - Eastern European States

Number of ballot papers:	176
Number of invalid ballots:	0
Number of valid ballots:	176
Abstentions:	1
Number of Members voting:	175
Required two-thirds majority:	117
Number of votes obtained:	
Czech Republic	113
Belarus	62

Group C - Latin American and Caribbean States

Number of ballot papers:	176
Number of invalid ballots:	1
Number of valid ballots:	175
Abstentions:	5
Number of Members voting:	170
Required two-thirds majority:	114
Number of votes obtained:	
Argentina	169
Honduras	1

Having obtained the required two-thirds majority, the following States were elected non-permanent members of the Security Council for a two-year period beginning 1 January 1994: Argentina, Oman and Rwanda.

The PRESIDENT: I congratulate the States which have been elected non-permanent members of the Security Council.

Since two seats remain to be filled, one from the African and Asian States and one from the Eastern European States, we shall now proceed to the first restricted ballot.

This second round of balloting shall be restricted to those two States from among the African and Asian States that were not elected but obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot, namely Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria; and to those two States from among the Eastern European States that were not elected but obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot, namely Belarus and the Czech Republic.

This is in accordance with rule 94 of the rules of procedure.

Ballot papers marked "A" and "B" will now be distributed.

May I ask representatives to write on the ballot papers marked "A", for the African and Asian States, the name of the State for which they want to vote, and to write on the ballot papers marked "B", for the Eastern European States, the name of the State for which they want to vote. Ballot papers marked "A" will be declared invalid if they contain the name of a State other than Guinea-Bissau or Nigeria and if they contain the name of more than one State. Ballot papers marked "B" will be declared invalid if they contain the name of a State other than Belarus or the Czech Republic and if they contain the name of more than one State.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Suziedelis (Lithuania), Ms. Jonsvik (Norway) and Mr. Berguido (Panama) acted as tellers.

A vote was taken by secret ballot.

The meeting was suspended at 12.15 p.m. and resumed at 12.45 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The result of the voting for the election of two non-permanent members of the Security Council is as follows:

Group A - African and Asian States

Number of ballot papers:	176
Number of invalid ballots:	2
Number of valid ballots:	174
Abstentions:	1
Number of Members voting:	173
Required two-thirds majority:	116
Number of votes obtained:	
Nigeria	105
Guinea-Bissau	68

Group B - Eastern European States

Number of ballot papers:	176
Number of invalid ballots:	1
Number of valid ballots:	175
Abstentions:	1
Number of Members voting:	174
Required two-thirds majority:	116
Number of votes obtained:	
Czech Republic	127
Belarus	47

Having obtained the required two-thirds majority, the Czech Republic was elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council for a two-year period beginning 1 January 1994.

The PRESIDENT: I congratulate the State that has been elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

Since one seat remains to be filled from among the African and Asian States, we shall now proceed to the second restricted ballot. This third round of balloting will be restricted to the two States from among the African and Asian States which were not elected but obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot - namely Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria. This is in accordance with rule 94 of the rules of procedure.

The ballot papers will now be distributed.

May I ask representatives to write on the ballot papers the name of one State for which they wish to vote. Ballot papers containing the name of a State other than Guinea-Bissau or Nigeria, as well as any containing more than one name, will be declared invalid.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Suziedelis (Lithuania), Ms. Jonsvik (Norway) and Mr. Berguido (Panama) acted as tellers.

A vote was taken by secret ballot.

The meeting was suspended at 1.05 p.m. and resumed at 1.15 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The result of the voting for one non-permanent member of the Security Council is as follows:

Group A - African and Asian States

Number of ballot papers:	176
Number of invalid ballots:	0
Number of valid ballots:	176
Abstentions:	1
Number of Members voting:	175
Required two-thirds majority:	117
Number of votes obtained:	
Nigeria	116
Guinea-Bissau	59

The PRESIDENT: This restricted ballot has been inconclusive. In accordance with the rules of procedure, we all continue with the series of restricted ballots, but in view of the late hour I propose that we postpone further balloting until the next meeting.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

United Nations
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records

44th PLENARY MEETING

Friday, 29 October 1993
at 3 p.m.

NEW YORK

President: Mr. INSANALLY
(Guyana)

The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 15 (*continued*)

ELECTIONS TO FILL VACANCIES IN PRINCIPAL ORGANS:

(a) ELECTION OF FIVE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The PRESIDENT: This afternoon, the General Assembly will continue with the election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council to replace those members whose term of office expires on 31 December 1993.

Since the second restricted ballot held this morning has been inconclusive and one seat still remains to be filled from among the African and Asian States, we shall now proceed to the third restricted ballot.

This fourth round of balloting shall be restricted to those two States from among the African and Asian States which were not elected but obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot - namely Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria. This is in accordance with rule 94 of the rules of procedure.

The ballot papers will now be distributed.

May I ask representatives to write on the ballot papers the name of the State for which they want to vote.

Ballot papers containing the name of a State other than Guinea-Bissau or Nigeria, or containing the name of more than one State, will be declared invalid.

I recognize the delegation of Guinea-Bissau.

Mr. TOURÉ (Guinea-Bissau) (*interpretation from French*): The General Assembly, after three rounds of balloting, has not been able to take a decision on the last vacancy for Africa. After three rounds of balloting, the General Assembly has not been able to decide between the two candidate countries, given that neither of those two countries was able to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority.

That situation is the result of not following the recommendation made by the Group of African States in New York with regard to the African candidacy. The General Assembly has always respected the recommendations of regional groups with regard to candidates. If it has been otherwise this year, it is because the information made available to Member States has been incorrect.

In point of fact - and contrary to the allegation made this morning - Rwanda and Guinea-Bissau are and remain the only two valid candidates put forward by the Group of African States. The results of the first three ballots amply demonstrate that the African Group has held to its decision and are eloquent testimony to the sense of discipline and cohesion on which the Group has always prided itself.

This morning's meeting demonstrated that the African States cannot and should not act in a disparate fashion if they wish to uphold their vital collective interests. Guinea-Bissau submitted its candidacy for the Security Council on the recommendation of the Group of African

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States because of its desire to serve the interests of that Group and to work with the rest of the international community in promoting peace and security in the world. The interests of States both large and small, taken individually, should not take precedence over collective interests, and it has never been the intention of the Assembly to endorse such precedence.

It is with that understanding and in a spirit of preserving the repute and higher interests of Africa that my delegation has decided to withdraw the candidacy of Guinea-Bissau. On behalf of my country I should like to thank all the delegations that supported and continue to support us and that have given us their encouragement.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Guinea-Bissau for his cooperation.

In accordance with the rules of procedure, we shall now proceed to the third restricted ballot, taking into account the statement just made by the representative of Guinea-Bissau.

We are in the process of voting, and I understand that the representative of Nigeria wishes to make a statement. I call upon that representative, on the understanding that his statement relates to the process under way.

Mr. GAMBARI (Nigeria): I want to thank the representative of Guinea-Bissau, a sister African country, for the conclusion of his statement. Nigeria has always acted in the best spirit of Africa unity, but, to put the record straight, I wish to say this:

There were indeed differences of opinion with regard to the recommendation of the candidatures committee within the Group of African States. In any event, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which is the highest political body of the African States, had indicated in the decision taken at the last meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers and the Summit Meeting that it had decided to recognize both Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau as candidates for the non-permanent seat on the Security Council to be vacated by Cape Verde.

I just wanted to set the record straight and to thank my colleague from Guinea-Bissau.

The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the rules of procedure we shall now proceed to the third restricted ballot, taking into account the statement made by the representative of Guinea-Bissau.

This round of balloting shall be restricted to those two States from among the African and Asian States which were not elected but obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot, namely, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria. This is in accordance with rule 94 of the rules of procedure.

I understand that the ballot papers have been distributed. May I ask representatives to write on the ballot papers the name of the State for which they want to vote. Ballot papers will be declared invalid if they contain the name of a State other than Guinea-Bissau or Nigeria and if they contain the name of more than one State.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Suziedelis (Lithuania), Ms. Jonsvik (Norway) and Mr. Berguido (Panama) acted as tellers.

A vote was taken by secret ballot.

The meeting was suspended at 3.45 p.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The result of the voting for one non-permanent member of the Security Council is as follows:

Group A - African and Asian States

Number of ballot papers:	162
Number of invalid ballots:	2
Number of valid ballots:	160
Abstentions:	8
Number of Members voting	152
Required two-thirds majority	102
Number of votes obtained:	
Nigeria	119
Guinea-Bissau	33

Having obtained the required two-thirds majority, Nigeria was elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council for a two-year period beginning on 1 January 1994.

The PRESIDENT: I congratulate the State which has been elected a member of the Security Council, and I thank the tellers for their assistance in this election.

The following five States have been elected members of the Security Council for a two-year term beginning on 1 January 1994: Argentina, the Czech Republic, Nigeria, Oman and Rwanda.

This concludes our consideration of sub-item *(a)* of agenda item 15.

The meeting rose at 4.05 p.m.

United Nations

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records

45th

PLENARY MEETING

Monday, 1 November 1993
at 10 a.m.

NEW YORK

President: Mr. INSANALLY
(Guyana)

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 14

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

(a) NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE REPORT OF THE AGENCY (A/48/341)

(b) DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/48/L.13 and Corr.1)

The PRESIDENT: I should like to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed today at 11 a.m.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I therefore request those representatives wishing to participate in the debate to inscribe their names on the list as soon as possible.

I am now pleased to invite the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Hans Blix, to present the Agency's report for the year 1992.

Mr. BLIX (Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency): Almost 40 years ago, in a speech to the General Assembly in December 1953, President Eisenhower launched the "Atoms for Peace" initiative, one feature of which was the creation of an international agency to

"devise methods whereby ... fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind." *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, 470th meeting, para. 118)*

It is to the "Atoms for Peace" initiative that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) owes its birth as well its mandate to seek to enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity, while time guarding against its use for military purposes.

The twin challenges thus described remain, but in a radically changed world. In my statement to the General Assembly last year I noted that we are at last moving into a world in which fewer resources will be used for military purposes, including nuclear arsenals. Even though many new and serious problems face mankind - for instance, environmental threats - we seem to stand on the threshold of an era in which "Atoms for Peace" can at last achieve its full meaning: an era in which many nuclear techniques may be disseminated, especially for the benefit of the developing world; an era in which a wider use of nuclear power may help to reduce some of the environmental threats to mankind; an era in which we may even begin to think seriously about how to organize a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Let me develop these themes. The objective of sustainable development was endorsed by the Rio Conference on Environment and Development, and outlined in Agenda 21. Nuclear techniques have much to contribute to this objective. The IAEA, as the central intergovernmental mechanism in the nuclear sphere, can play an important role - and not only in the areas of safe generation of energy and the safe disposal of radioactive waste. It can also facilitate the transfer of nuclear

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techniques to promote health, to ensure greater availability of fresh water and to secure important data on the atmosphere and the seas.

The IAEA is the only organization in the United Nations system operating its own laboratories, which have research and analytical capabilities that can be used - and are used - for environmental protection and sustainable development. Thus our laboratory in Seibersdorf, outside Vienna, is helping institutes in Africa to use nuclear techniques for conducting element analysis in air, water, soil and biological samples. Our Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco, *inter alia*, supports and helps marine laboratories in developing countries by providing expertise and training. This work forms an integral part of the Oceans and Coastal Areas Programme of the United Nations Environment Programme.

Agenda 21 recognizes that although energy is vital for growth, its generation and use can be sources of environmental degradation. The Agenda therefore calls for the design and implementation of environmentally sound energy strategies. This task will not be an easy one. All forms of energy generation and use entail some risks to health and to the environment. We shall need to aim at a mix of energy sources and ways of using them that minimize these risks. In the context of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Governments are now starting to make commitments to stabilize carbon dioxide emissions, which are linked to the uses of all fossil fuels. However, we are still far from formulating national and international energy policies that take into account all the implications of various energy choices.

To start with, we need more hard data about these implications. To obtain such data, the IAEA has for some years been engaged with other organizations in a project on databases and methodologies for the comparative assessment of the health and environmental consequences of different ways of generating electricity. The IAEA also contributes towards the process in which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is assessing the potential of nuclear power for mitigating greenhouse emissions. It is worth noting that most of the scenarios for future energy policies which lead to substantial reductions in global carbon-dioxide emissions contain a significant component of nuclear power.

Agenda 21 devotes a whole chapter to the environmentally sound management of radioactive wastes, reflecting the importance which the international community attaches to this issue. Agenda 21 encourages support for the IAEA's activities in this regard, especially in strengthening the capacity of developing countries in the field of sound nuclear-waste management. Much is being done within the IAEA to promote safe disposal of nuclear wastes - for instance, information exchange, expert assistance, advice and services in specific cases and work on establishing international norms. While non-binding radioactive-waste safety standards already exist, work is expected before long on a binding convention on the safe management and disposal of radioactive wastes.

Let me also mention in this connection that under the so-called London Dumping Convention the IAEA provides the technical basis for norms relating to the disposal of radioactive materials at sea. A moratorium on such disposal was recommended in 1985, and next month the Contracting Parties to the Convention will take a decision on whether to replace that moratorium with a complete ban.

As is well known, some sea disposal of radioactive waste has occurred despite the recommended moratorium and has caused concern. During 1992 and 1993 the IAEA took various initiatives to evaluate the potential impact of and possible remedial action with regard to radioactive-waste dumping in the Kara and Barents Seas. In cooperation with the Governments of Russia and Norway, the Agency, through its Monaco Marine Laboratory, took part in the sea expeditions organized by these two countries. An analysis of the environmental samples collected to date indicates that the present levels of radioactivity in the area of the dump sites are low. As a follow-up, the Agency initiated the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project to make a full evaluation of the possible health and environmental impact of radioactive wastes dumped in the shallow waters of the Arctic. The IAEA has declared that it is also ready to help assess the potential impact of the radioactive waste dumped in the North Pacific, including the Sea of Japan. The latest of these dumping actions took place very recently.

I should like to turn now to the safety of nuclear power. The efforts of the IAEA to develop not only recommendations but legally binding safety standards for nuclear-power plants have continued. I am glad to report to the Assembly that there is now a consensus about the structure and main contents of a nuclear safety convention. The scope of the convention would be limited to civil nuclear-power reactors. An important feature would be an obligation of the parties to report at agreed intervals to a meeting of contracting parties on the national application of safety principles laid down in the convention. That reporting would be linked to a system of international peer review. It is hoped that the convention will be approved within the next year.

The IAEA continues to assist in seeking to mitigate the consequences of the disaster at Chernobyl in 1986. It

participates in the Inter-Agency Task Force established by the United Nations under the chairmanship of Under-Secretary-General Eliasson. One very successful project has been to give cattle in the area affected by the nuclear fall-out from the Chernobyl accident a compound called Prussian blue, which radically and safely reduces radio-caesium contamination in meat and in milk. In addition, since the accident - and as a result of far-reaching changes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe - major efforts are under way to upgrade the safety of nuclear installations in this region. Assistance is offered by the G-24 Group of countries members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), by the Commission of the European Communities and by the World Association of Nuclear Operators. The IAEA focuses its assistance on implementing consistent international safety assessments and on making recommendations regarding the most urgently needed safety improvements. Some improvements in the safety of these facilities are now achieved as a result of the considerable work undertaken by all concerned - mostly, of course, by the countries in the region themselves.

In conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the IAEA has taken a further initiative to strengthen radiation protection and nuclear safety infrastructures in the States of the former Soviet Union.

I should now like to discuss how the IAEA can meet several new challenges it may be asked to take on in the field of security in the post-cold-war period.

In his message to the thirty-seventh General Conference of the IAEA the Secretary-General noted that, although the post-cold-war world is in some respects a safer one, it is also considerably more complicated. There could be a development that eventually leads all nations to do away with nuclear weapons, but there are also some new risks for a development in the opposite direction, that is to say, a spread of such weapons to further countries. The most important measures to prevent horizontal proliferation lie in the fields of security policy, in the creation of international and regional relations such that the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons disappears. It is, further, of crucial importance that the renunciation of nuclear weapons by each State be reliable. If it is not so perceived, there may remain incentives for other States to acquire such weapons. It is to give the greatest possible assurance that non-proliferation commitments are respected and reliable that IAEA verification safeguards are demanded and accepted by non-nuclear-weapon States.

In a world of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, a world of fewer nuclear weapons, there is need to feel confident both that non-nuclear-weapon States are not violating their non-proliferation commitments and that States legally committed to dismantle nuclear weapons do not secretly produce new weapons. The key to confidence-building is full nuclear transparency. The IAEA safeguards, particularly when applied to a State's complete nuclear-fuel cycle, are an instrument to create such transparency. Not surprisingly, considering the political and security significance of the reliability of non-proliferation commitments, some of the Agency's safeguards and verification activities have been at the forefront of political and media attention during the past year. I shall describe these activities in a moment. However, no rational assessment of the Agency's safeguards system or activities is possible without a realistic understanding of what they can and cannot do.

Safeguards inspectors are not a supranational police force that can parachute into a country and stop proliferation. They are inspectors who verify the correctness and completeness of State declarations about nuclear material and installations. Their reports, if reassuring, may create confidence and détente. If alarming, they may trigger action by the international community. Power to take collective action - diplomatic, economic or military - is vested in the Security Council, and it is to that body, in accordance with its Statute and its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations, that the IAEA will have to turn if its safeguards verifications point to acts of proliferation or if there is non-compliance with safeguards obligations.

The revelations about Iraq's undeclared nuclear activities highlighted the fact that in practice safeguards activities had been limited to declared nuclear material and declared installations. Following the experience of Iraq, the international community also looks for assurance about the non-existence of undeclared nuclear material and installations in States that have comprehensive safeguards. It looks to the IAEA safeguards to provide such assurance, in so far as it is possible. This has led to considerable efforts in the IAEA to strengthen the Agency's capacity to detect nuclear material and installations that should have been, but were not, declared.

Inspectors cannot go in blind search of undeclared nuclear material and installations. They must have information about where to go and what to ask. The single most important factor for building a capacity to find possibly existing non-declared material and installations is for the Agency to have access to information. Accordingly, measures are taken to strengthen the Agency's information base - for instance, regarding exports and imports of nuclear material and relevant equipment. However, all available safeguards-relevant

information must be scrutinized and analysed critically. There exists much erroneous information, and the Agency must seek to avoid false alarms. It is obvious that the more thorough and comprehensive the Agency's verification activities are, the more confidence and assurances they can provide. Fortunately, several new techniques and approaches, such as environmental monitoring, are emerging that may be used to give safeguards the greater detection capacity now asked for. These techniques and approaches will need to be tested, assessed thoroughly and accepted before they can be broadly used and relied on.

The central safeguards issue relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is that IAEA verification activities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea suggest that some nuclear material exists there which has not been reported to the Agency. Hence, the Agency cannot verify the correctness and assess the completeness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's report of material subject to safeguards. The Agency has not asserted that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is diverting nuclear material for weapons development. However, until such time as the inconsistency between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's report and the Agency's findings is satisfactorily resolved through additional information and visits to additional locations, the possibility that nuclear material has been diverted cannot be excluded.

One would expect that a Government faced with questions relevant to safeguards implementation would go out of its way promptly to provide the IAEA with clarification. Regrettably, so far, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has instead been seeking to restrict IAEA safeguards verification, thereby reducing transparency. Thus, the area of non-compliance with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement has been widening. As a result, a number of verification measures of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's declared nuclear activities have become overdue and the continuity of some safeguards-relevant data has been damaged.

The longer the Agency is precluded from conducting inspection, the more safeguards-related data deteriorate and the less assurance safeguards can provide that even the declared facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. For its part, the Agency is ready to conduct inspection of the nuclear installations and material which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has declared and submitted to safeguards. However, the inspection activities are an integral whole. They are not a set of activities from which an inspected State can pick and choose. The Agency is also ready to consult with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on all outstanding safeguards issues, including the question of the inspection of non-declared sites and additional information.

To conclude my comments on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, only the practice of full nuclear transparency, including full implementation of IAEA safeguards, can create the confidence that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear activities are devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

When a State joining the safeguards system has many nuclear installations and much nuclear material, it is always difficult to verify that everything has been declared. However, the Agency's activities in South Africa show that such difficulties can be successfully tackled through the sustained efforts of the IAEA and a high degree of cooperation and transparency by the inspected party. Since September 1991, when South Africa concluded its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, 22 IAEA safeguards missions have visited South Africa. Many apparent discrepancies and inconsistencies which were earlier identified have been resolved. No reason has been found to doubt the veracity of South Africa's initial declaration.

A new dimension was added when President De Klerk declared that South Africa had developed a nuclear-weapons capability but had destroyed it totally before acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agency was invited to examine that the programme had in fact been terminated and that all the nuclear material had been placed under safeguards. A team of Agency staff and nuclear-weapons experts visited South Africa for these purposes in April, June and August this year. It found no indication casting doubt on South Africa's statement that all the highly enriched uranium from weapons had been reported in its initial declaration.

For the past two and a half years, the IAEA has devoted much effort to fulfilling the mandate laid down in Security Council resolution 687 (1991) relating to Iraq. Some 21 inspection missions sent by the IAEA and considerable staff work in Vienna have enabled us to conclude that, in all essential aspects, Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapons programme has been mapped and either destroyed or neutralized. Declared, non-irradiated highly enriched uranium was removed from Iraq in November 1991 and a schedule has been established for the removal of declared, irradiated highly enriched uranium. When this activity is complete, no highly enriched uranium and no capacity to produce it should remain in Iraq.

There are still some gaps in our knowledge of Iraq's nuclear supply and procurement channels and about

sources of scientific and technical information. We hope that, on the basis of documentation very recently made available by Iraq, the last pieces of this picture will soon be clarified in a way which will contribute towards full and effective long-term monitoring. This will be essential to give assurance that Iraq does not seek to reacquire proscribed nuclear capability. In recent discussions in New York with the Iraqi side, the IAEA and the United Nations Special Commission have clarified how ongoing monitoring and verification are to be pursued. Such monitoring will not, of course, preclude the Agency from using the extensive rights of inspection in Iraq approved by the Security Council, should it need to do so.

On the basis of preparations carried out over the past year, the Agency has phased in, on a de facto basis, certain elements of its ongoing monitoring and verification plan provided for in Security Council resolution 715 (1991), a mandatory resolution that is automatically binding on all Member States. The approach which has been followed will allow the Agency to move into full and formal implementation of the plan at an early stage and thus accelerate the implementation of the Security Council resolutions, in so far as they relate to Iraq's nuclear capacity.

However, as I reported recently to the Security Council, before the IAEA can report that, in its view, Iraq has complied with the requirements of paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of section C of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq must formally acknowledge its obligations under Security Council resolution 715 (1991) and the plan approved thereunder, and the IAEA must satisfy itself that it is in a position fully to implement the plan. The IAEA must also verify to its satisfaction recent information provided by Iraq on suppliers.

I will now touch on some areas in which we can be sure that IAEA safeguards activities will expand and on some others where such expansion is possible. A good example of mutual openness and confidence-building in nuclear activities has been set by Argentina and Brazil. Increasing cooperation in the nuclear sphere between the two countries over the past decade culminated in 1991 in the Guadalajara Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy. This Agreement was supplemented by a quadripartite safeguards agreement which was signed in Vienna in December 1991 between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA.

Under this latter agreement, comprehensive IAEA safeguards will be implemented in the two countries. I am pleased to note that the Argentine parliament approved the safeguards agreement last year, and the Lower House of the Brazilian Congress has recently approved it. The application of comprehensive IAEA safeguards will by no means raise any obstacles to peaceful nuclear development in the two countries. Rather, it is likely to remove some obstacles to wider international cooperation.

It could also soon lead to the entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Latin America's becoming effectively a nuclear-weapon-free zone would be a major event, and would strengthen nuclear non-proliferation efforts generally.

I have already spoken about the Agency's verification activities in South Africa. The positive developments in South Africa may also lead to the conclusion of a Treaty making the whole African continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Agency is working closely with the United Nations-Organization of African Unity Group of Experts entrusted with the drafting of an African nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty.

In the Middle East, the peace process has passed a difficult hurdle. If the process accelerates, the prospects for a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction may increase. Support by the parties to the peace process for the concept of such a zone is firm.

Against the background of the many past conflicts and the deep distrust between the parties in the Middle East, there is naturally much interest in considering how, and by what means, effective verification of a nuclear-weapon-free zone can be achieved and how guarantees can be created for early warning of any violations, should they occur. There appears to be a general understanding, between the regional parties, of the need for comprehensive and far-reaching verification in a future nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Another important confidence-building measure would be the development of active cooperation between the parties, in the nuclear field, in an open and transparent manner.

In pursuance of a mandate placed upon me by a resolution of the IAEA's General Conference, I have been consulting States of the Middle East region with a view, *inter alia*, to facilitating the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in that region. In a further resolution, the General Conference added the request that the Director General should provide whatever assistance might be requested by the parties in the Middle East in support of the multilateral efforts of the peace process. I shall certainly respond to any such request.

In his statement to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 27 September this year, President Clinton spoke about steps to control the materials needed for nuclear weapons production, to address issues related to growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and to encourage all nuclear weapon States to refrain from nuclear testing and to begin negotiations towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In areas such as these, roles may be assigned to the IAEA which, while consistent with its mandate, would go beyond its traditional safeguards functions.

Current nuclear disarmament measures, as well as current reprocessing of spent civilian nuclear fuel, will lead to substantial quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium - that is to say, materials usable for nuclear weapons - which will have to be safely and securely stored before they are put to peaceful use or otherwise disposed of. Concerns about the safety and security of such materials might be alleviated by devising specific confidence-building measures which States could enter into either unilaterally or multilaterally. The IAEA has initiated some preliminary work in seeking to identify some of the problems and possible methods for managing plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

A verified cut-off for the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons or other explosive purposes has been under international discussion for many years. However, the present international climate gives grounds for hope that that discussion could lead to an agreement involving all States on an equal basis. The verification arrangements needed to underpin such an agreement would entail great challenges, having necessarily to focus on the largest and most complex of nuclear installations, that is to say, enrichment and reprocessing plants.

Methods and techniques of verification exist, but might have to be further developed. Should IAEA safeguards be applied to the operation or dismantling of all installations capable of producing weapons-usable material, the added verification workload - and the resources needed for it - would be significant. The value of a cut-off agreement would also be very significant.

Among the arms control measures now under discussion is an agreement on a complete ban on any kind of nuclear explosive testing. It has been suggested that the IAEA might be given a central role in verifying compliance with such agreement, including the management of an international data centre and the conduct of on-site inspections. The Agency has some experience and expertise in the field of seismic measurements, the main verification method under consideration, as well as in other relevant areas. I am confident that, with some added capacity, the IAEA would be able to perform verification tasks under a test-ban treaty, if entrusted with so doing.

The fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, in 1995, will also mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT continues to provide a solid framework for global nuclear non-proliferation endeavours, side by side with the other multilateral treaties on the subject.

In the presidential statement made at the Summit Meeting of 31 January 1992, the Security Council emphasized, *inter alia*, the integral role of effective IAEA safeguards in the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty. There is little doubt that the most important contributions which the Agency can make to the NPT are to continue to strengthen the effectiveness, efficiency and credibility of the safeguards applied under the Treaty, to continue to facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as prescribed by the Treaty, and to extend safeguards effectively to the new Parties to the Treaty.

In anticipation of the adherence of States of the former Soviet Union to the NPT, much preparatory work has been undertaken for the introduction of comprehensive safeguards in those States. Individual States members of the IAEA and the IAEA secretariat have helped to provide information and equipment to facilitate the establishment of effective national systems of nuclear accountancy and control. Actual implementation of safeguards must, however, await the conclusion of formal safeguards agreements. To date, only one such agreement has come into force, namely, with Lithuania.

I should like to conclude with some brief comments relating to the Agency's finances, programme and personnel. The Agency's financial situation remains precarious. Crises have been avoided only because substantial shortfalls in budgetary contributions to our activities have been met by curtailing or deferring some activities. When resources are so scarce, it is particularly important that they be used in a way which reflects the Agency's dual functions in a balanced and equitable manner.

The community of States must not lose out by default on this era of opportunity and challenge. The IAEA stands ready to perform a verification role in a number of vital arms-control and disarmament measures which may now become possible. However, the Agency must be given adequate resources to perform new tasks. Without such resources, limits will inevitably be placed on its ability to match up to the high expectations that are placed upon it.

Austria is an excellent host to all the international organizations located in Vienna, and I should like to finish this statement by expressing before the Assembly the thanks of the IAEA to the Government of Austria.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Blix for his introduction to the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and I congratulate him on his reappointment as Director General of the Agency.

I now call on the representative of Australia to introduce draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): I would like to introduce, on behalf of a wide and representative group of sponsors, draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1, adopting the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The sponsors are Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, the Gambia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Venezuela. Australia, which has the honour of chairing the IAEA Board of Governors this year, is introducing the draft resolution in accordance with the tradition that a representative of the Board of Governors Bureau introduces the draft resolution on the report of the IAEA in the General Assembly.

I note that it is the understanding of the sponsors of the draft resolution, which is traditionally developed in Vienna before being forwarded to the General Assembly, that it is not the role of delegations in New York to amend what has been agreed in Vienna. In line with this role, in order not to compromise the negotiating efforts of our colleagues in Vienna and to avoid opening a Pandora's box of conflicting suggestions, the sponsors believe that amendments to the draft resolution should not be accepted, since none were agreed in Vienna. That is, the sponsors do not wish to assume a negotiating role independent of the Vienna structures. Were we to do so, we would make a complex and sensitive situation even more difficult.

Turning now to the report of the IAEA itself, I should like to express appreciation to the Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, for his detailed and comprehensive statement introducing the annual report on the operation of the Agency in 1992.

As one of the founding members, Australia has long been an active supporter of the Agency, which remains an organization of critical importance to the international community. In the new world situation, the IAEA continues to play a vital role in fostering global peace and security and in promoting cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Director General and his staff deserve to be commended for their tireless efforts and personal devotion to the tasks of adapting the Agency to the fundamental changes and of responding adequately to the new challenges of our time.

Australia considers the annual report of the IAEA as a successful attempt to present a comprehensive and well-balanced analysis of the Agency's activities in 1992. The report clearly demonstrates that the Agency has continued to fulfil its responsibilities, as provided for in its statute and in the resolutions of the General Conference and the Board of Governors.

Australia participated in the process of detailed consideration and adoption of decisions related to IAEA activities during the period covered by its report. My delegation endorses this report, as it faithfully reflects the Agency's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, to improve the scope and the effectiveness of its nuclear-safety and nuclear-cooperation programmes, and to serve as a major source of technical assistance to Member States.

The past year has been an important one for the IAEA. New developments in disarmament and non-proliferation have had, and will continue to have, significant ramifications for the Agency: South Africa, in abandoning its nuclear-weapon status, has given a number of important verification tasks to the Agency; there are strong positive indications that Latin America and Africa may soon become nuclear-weapon-free continents; progress in the Middle East peace process may increase the prospects of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region; and the development of agreements on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and an a cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes could have implications for the IAEA in terms of possible international verification mechanisms.

We are pleased also that the General Assembly launched the preparatory process for the 1995 Conference on the Extension of the Treaty with the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee in May this year.

While responding effectively to new and positive developments, it is clear from the report just introduced by the Director General that the Agency faces continuing challenges relating to the dismantling of Iraq's near-nuclear weapons capacity, the existence of nuclear weapons in some States of the former Soviet Union and North Korea's non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations.

The Agency's safeguards system, together with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, constitute the principal international assurance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The safeguards system is not only fundamental to nuclear non-proliferation but it also underpins nuclear trade and cooperation. The efforts of the IAEA in the past few years to strengthen and improve the effectiveness and transparency of its safeguards system are commendable: action has been taken to reaffirm the Agency's right to undertake special inspections, to obtain earlier provision of design information on nuclear facilities and to establish a more comprehensive reporting system on nuclear imports and exports. New measures have also been proposed by the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system.

Nuclear safety remains a key area of the IAEA's work. Nuclear-safety standards are constantly being developed and upgraded by the Agency, not least in response to public perceptions concerning the benefits and risks associated with nuclear energy. Considerable efforts have been devoted in the past year to this field, both in the domestic and international spheres. Work has been undertaken in particular in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern and Central European countries to upgrade the safety of nuclear installations, with a specific intiative taken by the Agency, together with the United Nations Development Programme, to strengthen radiation protection in the States of the former Soviet Union. Also welcome is the development of a consensus on the structure of the main contents of a nuclear-safety convention.

The past year has also seen important developments in the Agency's technical assistance and cooperation activities, with new approaches being followed to increase the effective use of the resources available for the Agency's technical assistance programme.

Turning now to this year's draft resolution, we note that it is substantially the same as the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1992. Operative paragraph 4 would emphasize the centrality of strengthened safeguards to international security, regional security and technical cooperation; operative paragraph 6 would highlight the Agency's actions in strengthening technical assistance and cooperation activities; operative paragraph 7 would draw attention to the impartial efforts of the Director General and the Secretariat in seeking to implement the safeguards agreement still in force between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the importance of full implementation of the safeguards agreement; and operative paragraph 8 would emphasize that the Agency is continuing to do very valuable and dangerous work in Iraq which, we believe, requires recognition by the General Assembly, and that effective fulfilment of Security Council resolutions is essential for the continued effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime and the assurances that the regime provides to all members of the international community.

We commend this draft resolution to delegations. It has attracted a broad sponsorship. It is a balanced text and seeks to be responsive to the needs and interests of all IAEA members. Importantly, the efforts of the negotiators in Vienna have been respected through the maintenance of language adopted by the Board of Governors and by the General Conference. Above all, we all have a common interest - to see the maintenance and strengthening of the Agency and the protection of its activities which promote the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. To support this draft resolution is to support that objective.

Mr. SUCHARIPA (Austria): As representative of the country that has hosted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since its establishment over 36 years ago, I believe it is appropriate at the outset of my remarks to pay a tribute to the Agency for its continuing excellent record. I also wish to recognize the major contribution the Agency's competent and dedicated staff are making to the high profile of the IAEA.

Of course, I avail myself of this occasion also to congratulate the Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, on his reappointment for a fourth term of office, approved by the recent session of the General Conference. We offer him our best wishes for further success in his work during the coming years. I should also like to express our appreciation to the Director General for his comprehensive and forward-looking statement this morning.

Sweeping winds of change are starting to penetrate the traditional patterns of our post-Second-World-War thinking. International organizations such as the United Nations, and also those of a more technical character like the IAEA, have entered a process of readapting their agendas to new realities. The margins for resorting to blueprint solutions have narrowed. This situation poses new problems and challenges; it also provides us with fresh opportunities, which we must seize.

With those preliminary remarks of a more general nature in mind, I shall now briefly address a number of issues relating to the work of the Agency from my Government's perspective.

Nuclear safety, including the safe disposal of nuclear waste, has been and will continue to be an issue of high priority for countries such as Austria, which, in the absence of any significant nuclear activities of their own, nevertheless see their populations threatened by the prospect of suffering unbearable damage originating from the operation of unsafe nuclear facilities in their immediate or wider neighbourhood. The bitter lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident have, however, taught countries operating nuclear-power plants that nuclear power is unlikely to survive a second event of a comparable scale. That accident appears to have sharpened safety consciousness worldwide.

At the same time, we note that political changes have prompted a new level of openness and of sensitivity to matters of nuclear safety in the Central and Eastern European countries, including Russia and the newly independant States. While we are fully aware of their present economic constraints and their pressing energy demands as they head towards market-oriented economies, we appeal to these Governments of those countries seriously to consider non-nuclear power options when making their intermediate- and long-term energy policy choices.

In the meantime, concern among our public remains high with regard to possible hazards, particularly from the continued operation of considerable numbers of reactors of older design that are still far from meeting acceptable modern safety standards.

In that context, we acknowledge the major efforts towards upgrading the safety of these installations exerted nationally by operator States. The services offered and the advice and assistance given by the IAEA in this context continue to be essential and indispensable. We also hope that the substantial coordinated technical and financial assistance provided by the Governments of leading safety technology holders, bilaterally and multilaterally, will further accelerate the process of redressing the situation.

We have also taken note with great interest of the various important tasks undertaken by the Agency in connection with the implementation of Agenda 21, as outlined this morning here by the Director General.

Progress recently achieved, after extensive preparatory expert work under the leadership of the Agency, towards a nuclear-safety convention gives rise to optimism that a convention containing binding safety provisions, although limited in scope to civil nuclear-power reactors, could be agreed upon in 1994. Austria greets this development on the understanding that such a step would be followed without delay by negotiations for extending binding safety provisions to further sections of the nuclear fuel cycle.

To our regret, the status of ongoing negotiations for an improved liability regime for nuclear damage is far less promising, owing to still widely differing views among the interested parties.

Austria strongly supports the IAEA's efforts further to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. Results attained so far, such as the reassertion of the Agency's authority to conduct special inspections and the acceptance of broadened access to safeguards-relevant information to give greater assurance against the existence of undeclared nuclear activities are encouraging steps in the right direction. Further measures for reinforcing the system will have to be studied. None of them, however, can be a substitute for truly universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the *bona fide* execution of its full-scope safeguards provisions by all States.

The Agency's safeguards system has proved to be an important verification tool contributing to international arms control efforts. In this regard an expanded role for the Agency's verification functions, extending to areas which only recently have come under substantive discussion, might, as indicated by the Director General in his statement, soon become reality - as for example in the context of a future comprehensive test-ban treaty - in the safeguarding of fissionable material recovered from warheads in the course of the implementation of the START I and START II agreements and in eventual arrangements for a verified end to production of fissionable material for weapons purposes to complement nuclear-arms-reduction agreements.

As we approach the 1995 NPT review and extension conference, I am gratified to note that, apart from the fact that all nuclear-weapon States are now parties, a substantial number of additional non-nuclear-weapon States have in the more recent past acceded to the Treaty, bringing it a step closer to universality.

We have noted the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea not to put into effect its earlier intention to withdraw from the Treaty. With others, we strongly appeal to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to maintain that position and urgently to resume full cooperation with the Agency in the execution of the safeguards agreement and in resolving outstanding

safeguards issues, for its own benefit as well as in the interest of security and stability in the region and in the world. In that context we want to assure the Agency of our full confidence in its impartiality and integrity in the performance of its safeguards obligations under the statute.

Technical assistance and cooperation constitute one of the key elements of the Agency's activities. From the standpoint of my Government's support for that part of the programme, it is reassuring to note that the predominant portion of requests from Member States relate to non-power applications of nuclear technologies, notably in the fields of human health, food and agriculture, industry, physical and chemical sciences, and radiation protection. We also appreciate that particular emphasis is now being placed on the actual requirements as seen by the recipient countries and on infrastructural improvements, taking into account policies of sustainable development.

Let me conclude by reaffirming my Government's commitment to its role as the host country of the Agency, and Austria's continued high regard for the efficiency of this important member of the United Nations family. I also thank the Director General most warmly for his very kind remarks in that respect.

Mr. LAMAMRA (Algeria) *(interpretation from French)*: Allow me first of all to thank Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his very cogent presentation to the General Assembly of the thorough and many-faceted IAEA report. Mr. Blix has skilfully directed the Agency activities referred to in the report and has also contributed greatly, over the past 12 years, to the consolidation of the IAEA's authority and efficacy, thus renewing the confidence Member States have in him and leading to his reappointment. It is therefore a special pleasure for me to express to him, once again, warm congratulations from the Algerian delegation and from me personally.

In the sphere of IAEA activities, the period covered in the report before us has been a vigorous one internationally, even though in this particular domain, as in so many others, efforts to strengthen multilateral action for development seem doomed to advance only imperfectly and incompletely. As in the case of many other intergovernmental organizations, the adverse effect of shrinking financial resources is slowing down the Agency's impetus and unfortunately narrowing its field of activities, while at the same time mankind's ingenious breakthroughs in mastering the forces of nature seem to be constantly expanding the range of practical applications of nuclear technology in the service of the human race and its well-being. At a time when there are both promises and hazards inherent in the awakened interest of a number of nations that are giving nuclear energy a greater role, the IAEA, whose management and secretariat have fully grasped the meaning and importance of this major trend, must now, more than ever, be the crucible of strengthened international cooperation that embodies a fair balance between the Agency's *raison d'être*, which is the promotion of scientific, economic and social progress to respond to the growing needs of the entire international community, and its statutory obligation to monitor the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through its safeguards system.

The annual report of the IAEA gives us a very accurate account of the Agency's multifaceted efforts over the past year. This far-reaching undertaking has a number of positive impacts on the economies and the daily lives of certain developing countries that receive technical assistance from the Agency. These positive impacts, modest but none the less appreciable, can be seen in the valuable support of nuclear technology for such projects as the irradiation of foodstuffs in countries struggling either against famine or for nutritional self-sufficiency. There is also potential for considerable positive impact, through increased output and improved cost-effectiveness, in a number of fields of activity, such as agriculture, public health, industry or the use of locally produced radio-isotopes.

In addition to all that the IAEA, if given the proper resources, could do in contributing to sustainable economic and ecological development, it also has an important role to play in the vast area of human security, whose interrelated dimensions include the legitimate and widespread public apprehension regarding the devastating effects of nuclear disasters. This role is inherent in the Agency's fundamental responsibility for the safety of nuclear facilities in that it requires measures for practical cooperation and regulated output.

It is fitting here to underline the importance that is so naturally attached to the efforts that the Agency's directors should continue to make in order to achieve a dynamic balance between monitoring activities and promotional activities. In this regard, providing adequate, reliable and predictable financial resources for the Agency's technical assistance and technical cooperation activities should become an essential obligation for all States that desire to make it possible for the IAEA to carry out its mission to the fullest.

In this light, the universal influence of the IAEA and its prestige in the developing countries and in public opinion would be better and more lastingly served by concrete and significant achievements in the areas of technical assistance and nuclear safety. At the same time,

the very limited number of instances of safeguards-related problems that the Agency has dealt with, calmly and in the spirit of finding appropriate solutions, should result not in hampering the transfer of nuclear technology for the benefit of the developing countries but, rather, in providing reassurance regarding the IAEA's ability to assume its full role *vis-à-vis* the rights and obligations of parties to the safeguards agreements.

Against the dual backdrop of the IAEA's influence and the consensual nature that prevails in its relations with States, one of the aspects of the General Assembly's consideration of the Agency's annual report should be, we believe, to promote the widest possible interest in the Agency on the part of the international community and to contribute to encouraging all States to join it so that its membership can keep pace with the progress of the United Nations towards universality. Furthermore, the changes under way regarding the composition of the United Nations bodies having restricted membership should be quickly taken up by the IAEA so that it can enhance the representativeness of its Board of Governors by means of an expansion that would do justice to the desire for participation and would reward the deserving progress of certain developing countries in the area of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Algeria has every reason to be pleased about the relations it has developed with the IAEA. These flourishing relations go back many years, and through the years they have involved a great range of projects for technical cooperation, which have benefited from IAEA expertise and financing. These relations have also involved Algeria's voluntary submission of its two research and radio-isotope-production reactors to the Agency's safeguards system.

From a more general standpoint, Algeria has spared no effort to make its contribution to the proper functioning of the Agency and its main organs. We welcome the fact that, in return, the member States of the Agency conferred upon me, and, thus, on Algeria, the presidency of the Board of Governors for the period covered by the report the General Assembly now has before it.

Mr. UNNIKRISHNAN (India): At the very outset, I congratulate Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on his reappointment for a fourth term, with the unanimous approval of the recent General Conference of the Agency. During the last 12 years Mr. Blix has served the Agency with distinction and wisdom, and we have every confidence that he will continue to provide effective leadership to the IAEA in the new and varied tasks before it.

We have carefully perused the IAEA report and have also listened to the statement of its Director General with great interest. India has been a member of the IAEA since its inception in 1956. We have attached great importance to the objectives and activities of the Agency, as outlined in its Statute, and have been active participants in the IAEA from the beginning. The Agency's primary objective, as clearly spelt out in its Statute, is to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and development throughout the world.

We must also remind ourselves, when it becomes necessary, that its primary objective remains the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In recent years, for a number of political reasons, the Agency's "safeguards" role has come to acquire public prominence. We in India have always reaffirmed the importance of safeguards and have supported the Agency's activities in this area. At the same time, we attach importance to the Agency's promotional role in the fields of power, agriculture, medicine and other areas. The vast majority of the Agency's members, particularly the developing countries, have expectations of the IAEA and its role in the transfer of technology and in scientific and technical cooperation.

We note that these issues came up for discussion during the recent General Conference. The resolution adopted on the strengthening of the main activities (GC(XXXVII)/RES/618) asks the Agency to present new initiatives, particularly with regard to technical cooperation activities aimed at enhancing the scientific and technological capabilities of developing countries in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. We look forward to the Agency's initiatives in response to this resolution. A specific initiative in this regard over the last year is the proposal on practical utilization of food irradiation in developing countries. We welcome the General Conference resolution (GC(XXXVII)/RES/616) on this subject, and hope that further work will be done in this area, as a concrete and visible example of how the IAEA can assist developing countries.

The Agency's so-called failure to detect weaponization programmes in some countries has been referred to. In recent years the Agency has been criticized by some sections of the media on this score. In our view, such criticism stems from a misunderstanding of the Agency's proper role and functioning. The Agency cannot be a policeman on the prowl. It cannot be expected to go looking for bombs in every basement. Its role is to apply safeguards, essentially as a confidence-building measure in terms of the safeguards agreements that Member States voluntarily enter into with it. We believe that it will be useful for the Agency to explain the nature of its activities

to the public and the media so that such misconceptions can be removed.

References have been made to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India has always unequivocally supported all efforts at non-proliferation which are universal and non-discriminatory. However, I would like to repeat that we cannot subscribe to a Treaty or an attitude that divides the world into nuclear "haves" and "have-nots", with an inherently inequitable set of responsibilities and obligations for the two. I hope the NPT Review and extension conference in 1995 will be an opportunity for States Parties to ponder over how it can be made into an instrument leading to genuine non-proliferation. In this context, I would also reiterate our commitment to the goal of general and complete disarmament. The safeguards the IAEA implements flow from the agreements that Member States voluntarily enter into with it. This does not make the IAEA the secretariat of the NPT. The safeguards can also flow from other bilateral or multilateral arrangements, voluntarily entered into by sovereign States.

India is one of the founder signatories of the chemical weapons Convention. It has been suggested that the IAEA draw upon the provisions of the verification mechanism under this Convention to bring about modifications in the Agency's safeguards system. In this context, it should be recognized that the chemical weapons Convention is universal and non-discriminatory. Moreover, it is still at a nascent stage, and therefore rushing to copy its provisions before it has even come into effect would not be prudent.

References have been made to the implementation of the safeguards agreements between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This is a substantive and complex issue that has been under discussion at the IAEA and elsewhere for months. Our position has been that a solution to the issue should be found through patient negotiations and discussions. Any other avenue will not achieve the desired results. It is for this reason that we have in the past urged patience and perseverance. It is also for this reason that we have had to abstain on some of the resolutions on this subject at the IAEA. Despite reservations on some wording in the present draft resolution, we would go along with it in the interest of consensus, while urging both the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to persevere in their efforts to cooperate and fully implement the safeguards agreement. We also urge others concerned to continue to support such efforts.

Before I conclude, allow me to reiterate the need for the Agency to redouble its efforts in the promotion of the peaceful application of nuclear energy and to initiate large-scale public awareness programmes. The safeguards system should be streamlined to be both productive and cost-effective. For our part, we will render our full and active support and cooperation to the Agency in successfully achieving these aims.

Mr. WLOSOWICZ (Poland): At the outset I should like to express Poland's deep appreciation of the work of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its highly competent staff. This has been a particularly challenging year, in which the IAEA has performed very well. The exemplary manner in which the Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, has been conducting the work of his Agency merits our gratitude and respect. It therefore gives me great satisfaction to convey to the Director General my delegation's heartfelt congratulations on his reappointment to another term of office.

The delegation of Poland considers the annual report of the IAEA and the introductory statement by the Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, to be a successful attempt to present a comprehensive and well-balanced analysis of the Agency's activities in 1992. The overall activity of the Agency has remained faithful to the objectives enshrined in its statute: to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, through its safeguards activity, to serve the cause of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The latest developments in international relations have once again demonstrated the important role the Agency plays in the sphere of international security, economic development, nuclear safety and the human environment. These developments open new prospects for the Agency and, at the same time, pose new challenges to it.

Some events seem to indicate that the role of the Agency may be further expanded in the future to cover new verification tasks both in nuclear non-proliferation and in the process of nuclear disarmament. As we see it, an expanded verification function for the IAEA in respect of nuclear material released from a reduction in nuclear weapons would no doubt help the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and world-wide public acceptance of nuclear-power plants.

The Agency should be praised for its continued efforts in Iraq in fulfilment of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Iraq's non-compliance with its non-proliferation Treaty obligations exposed an urgent need for IAEA safeguards to be strengthened.

The Agency's intensive safeguards activities in South Africa as well as in verifying the termination of its past nuclear-weapons programme, has made credible that country's integration into the international nuclear

non-proliferation regime and is contributing to the process of the denuclearization of Africa.

We also welcome the news from Latin America, where the quadripartite agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA is close to implementation, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco will, it is hoped, soon come into force and cover all countries of the continent.

Recent progress in the peace process in the Middle East opens up brighter prospects for a future nuclear-weapon-free zone in that area with corresponding IAEA safeguards as part of the agreement.

We view all these positive developments in the context of the preparations for the 1995 review and extension Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty. We support the indefinite extension of the Treaty, which we believe remains indispensable for the security of its States parties and the world at large. We also see the need for a thorough and meaningful discussion of the Treaty's implementation, including the articles on nuclear disarmament and assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Expected progress in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and in the provision by all nuclear Powers of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should help to ensure the success of the Conference.

In the context of extending and strengthening the non-proliferation Treaty, we remain concerned about the question of the implementation of the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. At the recent IAEA General Conference we joined others in urging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with its non-proliferation Treaty commitments and safeguards obligations.

The IAEA activities aiming at the application of safeguards in the newly independent States with substantial nuclear programmes which emerged from the former Soviet Union are closely followed by and have the firm support of Poland. We urge all States which still remain outside the non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system to accede to them at an early date.

Nuclear-power plants operated or constructed in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the majority of them neighbours of Poland, have during 1992 and 1993 been subject to review and an assessment of their safety features. Improvements have been and still are being introduced in order to remedy the shortcomings identified in nuclear-power plants and in national nuclear regulatory systems. We are grateful to donor countries, to international organizations and, above all, to the IAEA for the assistance that has already been provided under this programme, in which Polish experts also participate.

Poland supports the Agency's work on preparing a nuclear safety convention. As regards the issue of liability for nuclear damage, we commend the substantial progress made by the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage in preparing a revision of the Vienna Convention.

Poland traditionally supports the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme, being both a beneficiary of and a contributor to it. International cooperation has been vital for the development of our nuclear industry, research and education.

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate our appreciation to the Director General of the IAEA, Mr. Hans Blix, and our support for the Agency's goals. That support finds its reflection in our co-sponsoring of the draft resolution on the report of the IAEA.

Mr. MALIK (Iraq) *(interpretation from Arabic):* The delegation of Iraq participates once again in the discussion on the agenda item on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which appears on the agenda on an annual basis. Every time the delegation of Iraq emphasizes that it is necessary not to politicize the work of the IAEA and to protect the technical nature of its work.

The politicization of the work of the Agency is very dangerous in both the short term and the long term. Hence we must all be objective, clear and take into consideration the real interests of member States. In this way we could avoid the narrow interests which push some countries into the dangerous path of politicization.

I have brought to this meeting copies of two documents. The first of these is the report submitted by Mr. Rolf Ekeus, the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission, to the President of the Security Council. This report, which is contained in document S/26571, dated 12 October 1993, includes the minutes of the discussions that took place in Baghdad in October 1993. Paragraph 14, which is in the section of the report dealing with Iraq's nuclear programme, reads as follows:

> "IAEA is confident that the essential elements of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme are understood and have been dismantled. The remaining outstanding issues for compliance with paragraphs 11, 12 and 13

of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) relate to procurement and official acceptance of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan approved by Security Council resolution 715 (1991)." *(S/26571, Appendix, para. 14)*

Paragraph 15 reads as follows:

"Iraq has now provided IAEA with critical information regarding suppliers of prohibited and other materials and sources of technical advice. The information appears to be complete and verifiable. This information will be verified in the course of the next few weeks. With the provision of this information, Iraq has now complied with all disclosure requirements concerning its previous nuclear weapons programme as contained in resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991)." *(ibid., para. 15)*

Paragraph 16, which relates to implementation of the monitoring and verification plan, reads as follows:

"IAEA has phased in elements of its plan over the last 15 months. Iraq is aware of all the elements of this plan." *(ibid., para. 16)*

Paragraph 18 reads as follows:

"IAEA is satisfied that the plan has so far been implemented properly and will add or subtract elements as conditions require." *(ibid., para. 18)*

The second document of which I have brought a copy is a Security Council report - document S/26584, dated 14 October 1993 -containing the text of a letter from the Director General of IAEA, Mr. Hans Blix, to the United Nations Secretary-General. This letter says:

"As you can see from the Joint Report, the IAEA has received the long requested critical information regarding suppliers of prohibited and other material and sources of technical advice. Subject to the verification of this information for accuracy and completeness, Iraq would be regarded to have complied with all disclosure requirements concerning its nuclear activities as provided for in resolutions 687 and 707 (1991). This is similar to the conclusions of the Special Commission with regard to the disclosure by Iraq of the information relevant to its proscribed programmes in the ballistic and biological areas." *(S/26584, p. 2)*

Mr. Blix has confirmed that fact this morning.

These testimonies of the two officials directly responsible for the implementation of Part C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) constitute crystal-clear evidence of the positive progress achieved recently, of the full cooperation of the Iraqi authorities at the highest level with the various inspection teams, and of Iraq's full compliance with the said resolution.

Any objective reader of the two Security Council documents from which I have just quoted - the one containing the Special Commission's report, and the other containing the letter from the Director General of the IAEA - would not fail to recognize the positive atmosphere of and the great progress that has been made in the relations between Iraq and those bodies.

The General Assembly should encourage this approach, rather than put obstacles in the way of the positive and constructive actions that Iraq has taken so far. There are those who insist on attacking Iraq, on manipulating the facts for political ends and on fabricating justifications for continuing the inhuman economic blockade against the people of Iraq, which has led to the death of hundreds of thousands of men and women - including old people - and children.

Iraq has discharged all its obligations under Part C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), and it expects the Security Council to end the economic embargo on its exports, in accordance with paragraph 22 of the same resolution. The Council's resolution which has been described as binding, must be binding to all parties, including the Security Council members.

Having said this concerning the binding nature of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), I should like to refer to paragraph 14 thereof, in which the Council:

"*Takes note* that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction". *(Security Council resolution 687 (1991), para. 14)*

It is worth observing that none of the representatives who have spoken so far has mentioned this paragraph or saw fit to call upon all the States of the region to work seriously towards its implementation, by adhering to the non-proliferation Treaty and accepting an effective safeguards system.

I should like, in conclusion, to comment on draft resolution A/48/L.13. The eighth preambular paragraph has become anachronistic indeed as it does not reflect the

present realities, to which the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and the Director General of IAEA have attested. According to the testimonies of those two gentlemen, Iraq has been cooperating and has abided by the provisions of Security Council 687 (1991). Consequently, the eighth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution should read as follows:

> "*Noting* the statements and actions of the Agency concerning Iraq's compliance with its non-proliferation obligations."

Consequently, this preambular paragraph in A/48/L.13 as it stands now contradicts the reports of the president of the Special Commission and the Director General of the IAEA, and cannot be considered as it is correct. We cannot agree to it.

As for operative paragraph 8, it fails to mention the discussions that took place in Baghdad in July, in New York in September and again in Baghdad in October of this year. These important and constructive talks took place between Iraq and the Special Commission and an IAEA team. Consequently, this paragraph does not reflect the real facts, which have become known to everybody here.

For all these reasons, the delegation of Iraq would request separate voting on the aforementioned paragraphs and on the resolution as a whole.

Before I conclude my statement, I cannot but say that it is really ironic and paradoxical that Israel is one of the sponsors of this draft resolution.

Ms. MASON (Canada): At the outset, let me echo the satisfaction which others before me have expressed to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix, for his detailed and comprehensive statement.

Canada is very pleased to sponsor draft resolution A/48/L.13 and Corr.1 on the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is most appropriate at this time to acknowledge the range of work of this important United Nations agency.

Now more than ever, we are aware of the vital role that the IAEA plays in supporting the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole, given the Agency's paramount role as the custodian of international safeguards arrangements. The IAEA is also key in ensuring the safe use of nuclear energy and in promoting the peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

In the past year, the Agency has faced some new - and, unfortunately, disquieting - challenges to the integrity of the international system it supports, challenges posed especially by developments in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, both of which are referred to in the draft resolution. However, these developments have also proved that the Agency is the best forum to deal with such problems. The Government of Canada remains concerned about non-compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its safeguards agreement and continues to urge that country to meet its obligations. We also want to take this opportunity to reiterate that the Agency functions to advance the interests of all Member States and thus acts on behalf of the international community as a whole.

I want to use this opportunity to share briefly some Canadian thinking about the orientation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In our statement to the recent General Conference, we proposed that the basic mission of the Agency be refocused to consist of three pillars: safeguards, safety, and technology transfer.

The purpose of safeguards is to ensure that an effective and efficient system is implemented and maintained. Study is now being given to how to strengthen and streamline safeguards. Canada believes that Agency safeguards should evolve from a purely quantitative system, based on material balance accounting, to one which includes the detection of undeclared activities and facilities. There are several alternative safeguards models which are capable of doing this. The reform of safeguards will require the marshalling of our collective political will, to ensure that our joint efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation are as effective and efficient as possible.

Safety is another key function of the Agency, since being able to demonstrate the safety of all nuclear activities is one of the keys to furthering public acceptance of nuclear energy. For many countries, nuclear power will become an increasingly important source for meeting growing energy demands. It also offers some environmental benefits. We therefore look forward to the early conclusion of the negotiation on the nuclear safety convention, which will be an important international instrument in this field.

Technology transfer is another key activity of the Agency. It permits the appropriate applications of nuclear technology in meeting the needs of Member States in the fields of food and agriculture, human health, water resources, environmental studies, industrial applications and, of course, energy.

In Canada's view, each of these three pillars is interrelated with and interdependent on the other. Taken together, we believe that this three-pronged approach can lead to a good balance - and, I might say, a mutually reinforcing balance - among the Agency's activities.

In conclusion, the Canadian delegation is pleased to co-sponsor this draft resolution, and, along with the Australian delegation, which introduced it, Canada commends it to all delegations as an expression of the commitment we have all made to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to nuclear non-proliferation.

Mr. HOU Zhitong (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation listened carefully to the statement of Mr. Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and has taken note of its annual report. Over the past year, the Agency has done a great deal of work and exerted active efforts in such major fields as safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear safety. For this, we wish to express our satisfaction.

Mr. Ouedraogo (Burkina Faso), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The Chinese delegation warmly congratulates Mr. Blix on his reappointment as Director General of the Agency.

International cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is an important task confronting the Agency. Nuclear energy, as a clean and reliable alternative energy source, has brought prospects for development. Many countries, especially the developing countries, urgently need nuclear energy for their economic development and environmental protection. The international community expects the IAEA to make further efforts and contributions in this regard.

Another important task facing the IAEA is to implement safeguards that will prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including nuclear explosive devices. Over the years, the Agency has accomplished a lot and accumulated wide experience in this regard. The safeguards regime is a universally accepted measure for the prevention of nuclear proliferation. In order to ensure that international cooperation on nuclear energy will serve peaceful purposes, the acceptance of IAEA safeguards should be the prerequisite for such cooperation.

In the past year, the IAEA, as an intergovernmental organization, has played a unique role in international cooperation for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But, it should be noted that current international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is far from satisfactory, and is faced with numerous difficulties and problems. The attempt to monopolize nuclear science and technology and, under the pretext of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to restrict and undermine the legitimate rights and interests of the developing countries in regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will facilitate neither international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy nor the international endeavour to prevent nuclear proliferation.

The Agency is faced with the challenge of how to strike an equitable balance between efforts to promote international cooperation in nuclear energy and those being made to strengthen the safeguards regime. The Chinese delegation is of the view that equal importance should be attached to both of those IAEA functions without prejudice to either. China supports the Agency's efforts in its safeguards activities and believes that they should be aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation rather than at impeding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by developing countries. Should disputes arise in this connection, they should be solved by the parties directly involved through constructive consultations and negotiations and not by the imposition of pressure or even sanctions. Practice has shown that neither pressure nor sanctions will help to solve the problem.

I should like to reiterate that the Chinese Government's policy has always been against advocating, encouraging or engaging in nuclear proliferation and against assisting other countries to develop nuclear weapons. China's nuclear-export policy has always been based strictly on three principles, namely, that such exports are intended for peaceful purposes, that IAEA safeguards have been accepted and adhered to and that there will be no transfer of material to any third country without China's prior consent. China will, as always, continue to contribute to and make efforts towards achieving international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in order to realize greater benefits for mankind derived from nuclear energy.

Mr. GUILLAUME (Belgium) *(interpretation from French)*: It is my honour to speak today on behalf of the European Community and its member States.

The Assembly has before it today the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) drafted by its Director General, Mr. Blix, whose mandate has just been renewed for four more years. Before beginning consideration of the report, I should like, on behalf of the European Community and its member States, to take this opportunity to congratulate the Director General for his work, to thank him for the able manner in which he has conducted the work of the Agency for the past 12 years

and to convey to him our warmest wishes for the years ahead, years that will be decisive for the policy of non-proliferation, in particular, in which his is a crucial role.

At the outset, I should like to speak about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, an area in which the international community and the Agency have had to deal with major developments during the past year.

The most serious problem was the non-implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The European Community and its member States remain deeply concerned at the fact that, notwithstanding the international community's forbearance, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not yet fulfilled the commitments into which it has entered; they solemnly urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reaffirm its unconditional adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to implement in good faith the full-scope safeguards agreement entered into with the IAEA on 30 January 1992 and to agree to inspection of the two sites designated by the Agency. Furthermore, the European Community and its member States keenly regret that in the course of recent consultations with an IAEA delegation at Pyong Yang the Democratic Republic of Korea expressed no readiness to honour its commitments but, on the contrary, sought to limit the scope of the consultations and even to set conditions for their continuation, which is unacceptable. However, we hope that the consultations can resume without preconditions and in a constructive spirit.

The European Community and its member States thank the Director General and his secretariat for the diligence, professional skill and impartiality they have demonstrated throughout this delicate period, and we would ask them to continue their activities with vigour. In addition, we would request the Agency's Director General to keep the Security Council and States members of the Agency informed of any major development in this connection.

In addition, the European Community and its member States hope for resumption of the dialogue between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea that will in the near future, in keeping with the Joint Declaration signed on 31 December 1991, lead to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

The European Community and its member States wish also to express their concern at the situation in the former Soviet Union. We welcome, of course, the accession of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Uzbekistan to the NPT. They also appreciate the secretariat's efforts to prepare for the implementation of safeguards in other States of the former USSR. We urge those countries, especially Ukraine and Kazakhstan, to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. More generally, we urge those two States to apply, without delay, the commitments contained in the Lisbon Protocol. The European Community and its member States hope that the agreement reached between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on 3 September 1993 concerning the return to Russia of those nuclear warheads located in Ukraine will be implemented without delay.

Another source of major concern is the situation in Iraq. The European Community and its member States regret that that country has not yet implemented the provisions of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). They urge Iraq to provide the IAEA with all the necessary data on its nuclear programme that is not yet available.

The European Community and its member States request the Director General to implement without delay the provisions of the plans for future ongoing monitoring called for in Security Council resolution 715 (1991) while continuing, as provided in resolution 687 (1991), to seek out the constituent elements of Iraq's clandestine programme that have not yet been disclosed.

Another major development concerning non-proliferation was, of course, the South African Government's acknowledgement of the fact that nuclear explosive devices had been developed in South Africa during the 1980s and that they had been dismantled prior to South Africa's accession to the NPT. The European Community and its member States welcome that transparency, which demonstrates that the renunciation of a clandestine nuclear programme is possible and that it can be done at the will of the country in question. We also take note of the Director General's report on the Agency's verification activities in South Africa.

In that connection, the European Community and its member States welcome the substantial progress made over the past year in the negotiations on the creation of a denuclearized zone in Africa.

The European Community and its member States welcome the progress towards peace in the Middle East. Recent developments justify the hope that conditions for the creation of a denuclearized zone in that region and implementation of the full-scope safeguards system in the Middle East can soon be realized.

The European Community and its member States hope that the process of ratification of the quadripartite agreement signed by Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material and the IAEA will soon be completed.

To conclude with the subject of non-proliferation, the European Community and its member States welcome with satisfaction the recent accessions of countries to the NPT, which constitute important steps towards the universality of the non-proliferation regime, and we strongly urge all countries that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty for an indefinite period. This was reaffirmed at the first session of the Preparatory Committee held at New York last May. We would recall that the NPT is the only comprehensive framework for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, the European Community and its member States are prepared to assume their full responsibilities and to spare no effort that can contribute to the success of the preparatory process for the 1995 Conference.

On 10 August, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva adopted by consensus a decision giving the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. A multilateral negotiation will soon begin, with a view to achieving a universally applicable treaty providing for an effective verification regime. The European Community and its member States welcome this decisive step, which will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We have noted in recent months some encouraging developments which will certainly have a positive effect on the question of a nuclear-test moratorium. Even if the Twelve cannot be indifferent to the recent test in China, the first in a year, the recent decisions of some nuclear-weapon States to suspend their nuclear tests are an important development. We must welcome this further progress in the struggle against nuclear-weapons proliferation. Moreover, we should recall the commitment undertaken by the United States and the four members of the Commonwealth of Independent States that signed the Lisbon Protocol to reduce significantly their nuclear arsenals; this constitutes another step in the same direction. The Twelve hope that the parties concerned will soon be able to overcome any obstacle in the way of implementation of the Protocol.

The European Community and its member States are pleased that the proposals they made two years ago to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system were adopted by the Board of Governors and that the measures necessary for their application are being gradually implemented. For instance, machinery has been set in motion for notification of exports and imports of nuclear material and exports of some non-nuclear equipment and material. It should be recalled that the purpose of this machinery is to give the secretariat an overview of nuclear transfers and production throughout the world. If we wish to achieve that aim, all countries must participate in this machinery and communicate the relevant information. With respect to the European Community and its member States, such information is now being regularly communicated to the Director General.

The strengthening of the Agency's safeguards is not yet complete. Substantial efforts remain to be made to deal with the real dangers of proliferation. In this respect, the European Community and its member States are pleased that the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution submitted at the Twelve's initiative.

The study conducted by the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system provided a useful working basis for the secretariat to review the safeguards system more thoroughly. The purpose of this exercise is to make possible better detection of anomalies indicative of clandestine activity, even though it is difficult to see how the Agency will ever be able to guarantee with any certainty the absence of clandestine activities world wide.

Furthermore, while we cannot ignore the need to reduce the cost of inspection missions, we must ensure that this requirement does not hinder the development of a consistent plan that can ensure the overall efficiency of the Agency's safeguards, taking into account in a balanced way the actual risks of proliferation. The European Community and its member States listened with great interest to the Director General's report on the measures taken to strengthen and improve the Agency's safeguards system and look forward to the concrete proposals he will make on this subject to the Board of Governors in December on the basis of the findings of the Standing Advisory Group and the deliberations of the Board of Governors in June.

The ongoing negotiations to achieve a partnership between the Agency's inspection teams and EURATOM have made substantial progress over the past year. Enhanced cooperation has already had beneficial effects on the Agency's budget. The European Community and its member States welcome this. However, the full benefit anticipated from this agreement remains subject to many contingencies.

The commitment of the two teams of inspectors to apply the partnership principles is indispensable. The

European Community and its member States request the Director General to pursue discussions with a view to putting this partnership fully into effect as soon as possible. In the discussions on the partnership, one of the most important elements of the progress achieved in recent months has been the confirmation of EURATOM as a regional safeguards system for ensuring that nuclear materials are not diverted to uses other than those declared by the States members of the European Community. EURATOM thus exercises functions that cannot in any way be exercised by a national monitoring system.

Today, EURATOM is the sole example of an organization that makes possible the full implementation of safeguards while adhering to five essential elements: a constitutional framework for political cooperation; a well-defined legal and regulatory framework; a transparent budgetary and financial framework; an operational framework providing for the possibility of imposing sanctions; and, lastly, several decades of experience in the effective implementation of safeguards.

The status of regional safeguards system could be conferred on other regional institutions, provided that certain clearly defined conditions were met. That is why the European Community and its member States urge the Director General to consider and submit to the Board of Governors a document on the conditions that must be met by a regional organization if it is to negotiate a partnership agreement with the Agency. This document should precisely stipulate the conditions for cooperation with respect to safeguards.

The European Community and its member States are deeply committed to the nuclear-export-control systems and, more specifically, to the guidelines adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The European Community and its member States appeal to the supplier countries that have not yet acceded to the export-control guidelines to do so as soon as possible. We wish to contribute to the success of the regime for controlling the export of nuclear material and technology of dual use which entered into force in January 1993. All the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group have decided to require the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities, present and future, as a condition for new significant commitments to supply non-nuclear-weapons States.

Having spoken of non-proliferation and the safeguards system, I should now like to touch on the activities of the Agency in the sphere of nuclear safety, protection against radiation and technical cooperation.

The benefits of the Agency's activities in areas where nuclear technology is not being used for energy purposes are often underestimated and poorly understood. I should like to speak first of nuclear safety, a sector in which the Agency plays a primary role.

The European Community and its member States welcome the substantial progress made by the group of experts that is to prepare a convention on nuclear safety. In fact, we were the promoters of the convening of the Conference on nuclear safety which decided to initiate the process of negotiating that international convention. We believe that the convention is a necessary instrument to improve world wide, the safety system on the one hand and the cohesion of the basic safety principles on the other. That is why the European Community and its member States invite all States - particularly those with nuclear reactors on their territory - to participate actively in the preparatory work for the convention.

We can say that a clear consensus is emerging on limiting the scope of the convention, for now, to power reactors. A diplomatic conference should be able to finalize the text of the convention as early as possible in 1994.

As regards a progressive approach to establishing an international nuclear safety regime, we welcome the fact that the last General Conference provided an opportunity for the international community to express its desire to start work as soon as possible on preparing a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management, once the work now under way of developing basic principles for managing these wastes has achieved a broad international consensus.

The Twelve recognize the usefulness of more advanced technical research into the safety of other parts of the nuclear cycle, and also recognize that this work may in due course facilitate the future development of existing international instruments and of those to come. The European Community and its member States introduced a draft resolution on the subject at the IAEA General Conference.

The European Community and its member States attach particular importance to nuclear safety in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former USSR, and recall the Community countries' substantial contributions both in a strictly Community context - PHARE and TACIS - and in the Group of 24 and the multilateral nuclear safety funds. We commend the Agency on its important role in this regard.

The Operational Safety Review Teams and Assessment of Safety Significant Events Teams missions, as well as the programmes for problem reactors, have

continued to provide useful reference information for the activities of the Group of 24. New initiatives, such as the joint activities of the IAEA and the United Nations Development Programme to strengthen radiation protection infrastructures and nuclear safety infrastructures in the countries of the former USSR, and the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project, are adding to the Agency's involvement in improving nuclear safety.

For some time, the IAEA Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage has been reviewing the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and preparing a new convention on supplementary financing. Substantial results have been achieved. The Community and its member States attach great importance to the new drafts; we sincerely hope that the ongoing discussions will make it possible to arrive quickly at solutions satisfactory to all concerned and that a diplomatic conference will be able to meet as soon as possible to finalize the draft conventions.

The European Community and its member States view providing technical assistance as one of the Agency's essential tasks. We support the efforts along these lines made by the IAEA secretariat. We feel that the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, whether medical, agricultural, industrial or for power production, should be accessible to all States. The Agency has a central role to play in accelerating and facilitating this trend, while ensuring that the development of nuclear activities goes hand in hand with observance of the highest levels of safety and radiation protection. The Twelve States members of the European Community are ready to lend the Agency their support in this area, to the extent that budgetary considerations permit.

The European Community and its member States regret having to express their concern, as they did last year, about the Agency's financial situation. In the interests of the Agency's proper functioning, we appeal to all member States to pay their contributions to the Agency's budget on time.

We appreciate the efforts of the Director General and his colleagues to ensure that the Agency can function in these difficult conditions. In this context, the Twelve are the more appreciative of the exercise recently begun by the secretariat to study the efficiency of the Agency's programmes in greater depth. The Agency must more than ever be able to concentrate on its essential tasks and terminate activities of secondary importance.

Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary): The annual report for 1992 that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has submitted to the General Assembly, together with the supplementary oral report and the introductory statement by the Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, reflect very well the multifaceted activity of the Agency and the results achieved. The Agency's work, carefully balanced between the main fields of its activity, deserves the recognition of the Member States, as expressed at the thirty-seventh session of the Agency's General Conference, held only a short time ago.

Reiterating that evaluation, I wish to express the Hungarian Government's appreciation of the skilful and fully committed work carried out by the Agency's staff in order to promote the peaceful application of nuclear energy worldwide, enhance the safety of the nuclear facilities in operation, and provide verifiable assurances for the community of nations about the non-diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes.

On behalf of the Hungarian delegation, and also on my own behalf, I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. Blix on his recent reappointment for another term of office, and assure him of our continued support and cooperation in discharging his important and responsible duties.

Despite some discouraging signs, the positive trend towards attaining our common goal, the establishment of a genuinely universal nuclear non-proliferation regime, has continued during the period under review. We are pleased to note that all nuclear-weapon States are now Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); South Africa has abandoned its nuclear weapons programme; and Latin America as well as Africa may soon emerge as nuclear-weapon-free continents. In view of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, these facts should be considered very promising.

However, international efforts should be redoubled to prevent and finally eliminate the threat of nuclear proliferation, and also to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its aspects. Pursuing its fully committed non-proliferation policy, the Hungarian Government continues to take an active part in this endeavour and once again urges all those States that have not yet done so to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, and also to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

The IAEA safeguards system, a key element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, has always played a crucial role in preventing the use of nuclear energy for other than peaceful purposes. We are appreciative of the work done so far by the Agency to improve the efficacy of the existing safeguards system. The purpose is clear: to make the safeguards system more capable of covering both

declared and undeclared activities, thus providing sufficiently convincing assurances for all States about the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programmes of other States. The Hungarian Government supports the ongoing work in that field, and once again reiterates its readiness to make all its facilities available to the IAEA to carry out the related tests and trials.

It is regrettable that the international community has again been compelled, in the period under review, to deal with problems endangering the integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In addition to the case of Iraq's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, attention has had to be paid to the ambiguous attitude of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards agreement it concluded with the IAEA.

I should like to express our appreciation to the Agency for all its work and efforts in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq. We are convinced that the IAEA will soon be able to fulfil its remaining tasks, including ongoing long-term monitoring and verification.

The Hungarian Government is gravely concerned at the lack of progress in the implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency. We deeply regret that the IAEA has not yet been able to clarify the discrepancies discovered in the initial inventory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. All the efforts made by the Director General on the basis of the respective resolutions of the Board of Governors, including the requested access to additional locations and information, have so far not been successful.

The Hungarian Government continues to support the Director General's efforts to maintain the continuity of the Agency's safeguards over the declared nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to carry out consultations with it aiming at the full implementation of all the relevant resolutions. We expect the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil its Treaty obligations without any preconditions and to respond favourably to repeated appeals by the world community to provide full transparency of all its nuclear activities. We believe that such developments would contribute, not only to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to easing tensions and improving security in the East Asian region, but also to the security of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea itself.

Strenuous efforts should lead - in the not-too-distant future, we hope - to a new international agreement on a comprehensive ban on all nuclear explosions. The cut-off of the production of all weapon-grade fissile materials, such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons or other explosive devices, which has been discussed for many years, should also be achieved soon. Such developments, as well as the expected release of the fissionable material from dismantled nuclear weapons and the ever-growing amount of plutonium from the ongoing reprocessing of spent civilian fuel, require an effective international verification mechanism.

In our view, the Agency's professional and technical knowledge and the experience it has accumulated during the last 25 years in the field of verification-related safeguards activity are of great value to the world community. When searching for real solutions to the emerging new verification tasks of a nuclear non-proliferation nature, such values should be properly and fully utilized.

The Hungarian Government appreciates the Agency's work in providing safety-related technical assistance to Eastern and Central European countries. Its programme related to the safety of water-cooled and moderated reactor plants is truly of great importance to the safety-enhancement programme of our own nuclear power plant in Hungary. At the same time, taking into account the internationally recognized good operational-safety record of that nuclear-power plant, the experience and knowledge of the Hungarian institutions could well be utilized in international efforts aimed at enhancing the safety of Soviet-designed reactors.

We also commend and support the Agency's activity on strengthening and improving the legal basis of nuclear safety, including efforts to conclude the preparatory work on a convention on nuclear safety, which is to be adopted at a diplomatic conference in 1994.

Being at the same time a recipient and a donor country, Hungary attaches great importance to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund of the International Atomic Energy Agency. For the time being, our country is receiving technical assistance in matters of such fundamental importance for the Hungarian nuclear industry as the evaluation of the earthquake resistance of our nuclear power plant and the implementation of our long-term complex strategy for the management and final disposal of radioactive wastes. On the other hand, the Hungarian nuclear facilities are open, through the IAEA's training and fellowship programme, to representatives from developing countries in order to share with them

knowledge and experience in the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

Our nuclear power plant continues to have great economic, technical and social impact on the whole country, as almost one half of Hungary's total net electricity production is generated there. Ten years ago, Hungary received significant assistance from the IAEA to develop the required technical, scientific and operational know-how necessary for safe nuclear-power production. Since then, the Agency and its internationally recognized experience have continued to be the most important professional source we can rely on in realizing our peaceful nuclear programme.

Mr. SHERBAK (Russian Federation) *(interpretation from Russian)*: The delegation of the Russian Federation would like to join the other delegations which have already expressed their support for the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 1992. While commending what is being done by the Agency, we associate its success particularly with what has been done by Mr. Hans Blix, who, as Director General of the IAEA, has already proved himself to be a skilful organizer and an experienced administrator. Russia supported the recommendation of the Board of Governors to appoint him to this responsible and important post for an additional four-year term. We wish him every possible success in his further work.

The world stepped from the cold war into a new era. Partnership is now replacing confrontation. The quest for political solutions is becoming more and more consolidated as the only acceptable way of resolving both new and old conflicts. There are increasing possibilities for constructive cooperation between States in guaranteeing security and in resolving economic, scientific and technological problems. There has been a tangible increase in the role of, and practical opportunities available to, international organizations, and, first and foremost, organizations such as the IAEA. The Agency, quite justifiably, is in the forefront of those who are seeking to resolve the general problems facing mankind in satisfying its growing energy needs and at the same time to provide safeguards to ensure that these efforts, including international cooperation, are directed to peaceful purposes.

The focal point in the whole range of nuclear problems facing the human race is the finding of means to further strengthen the international regime relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of paramount importance here is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty has proved its effectiveness and efficacy in the reduction of nuclear weapons and is having a positive impact on political stability in the world. We are convinced that those participating in the Second Review Conference on the Treaty, to be held in 1995, will take the historic decision to extend it for an indefinite period. Russia will do everything it can to convert the Treaty into a genuinely universal international legal document, and it is confident that the Agency will make a noteworthy contribution to constructively preparing for this meeting.

We welcome the growing number of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), particularly Armenia, Belarus and other countries members of the Commonwealth of Independent States that have recently acceded to the Treaty. We hope that other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, first and foremost Kazakhstan and Ukraine, will soon accede to the NPT and place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

On the other hand, I must note the Treaty's recent tribulations. The world community was deeply concerned by the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That decision has now been suspended, which is a step in the right direction. It is important that a complete review of the decision follow and that everything be done to enable the Agency to exercise full supervisory functions under the NPT, as outlined in the current safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the IAEA.

Radical changes on the international scene and growing trust between the nuclear States has made it possible not only to seek agreement on considerable reductions in nuclear weapons, but also to take qualitatively new steps in that direction.

Russia has been and remains committed to the goal of banning nuclear-weapon tests. We are pleased that the Conference on Disarmament has at last reached agreement on a decision in principle to commence multilateral talks on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Russia has been listening very carefully to new ideas put forward at this session concerning the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Many of these are in basic accord with the Russian position. We propose the commencement of focused talks at the Conference on Disarmament with a view to drafting a multilateral agreement on the supervised cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. We consider that in the context of such an agreement all nuclear-weapon States would have to agree to place weapons-grade materials resulting from the destruction of the eliminated nuclear weapons under international control

under the auspices of the IAEA. In the interests of transparency, Russia is prepared to exchange information in accordance with what has already been agreed concerning the quantities of materials and the facilities in which they are stored. We are certain that agreement on these matters would make a great contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

In Russia, we no longer manufacture weapons-grade uranium; a programme to cease production of weapons-grade plutonium is now under way.

An outstanding feature of our new era is the real progress that has been achieved in the field of nuclear disarmament. Tens of thousands of warheads are now scheduled for dismantlement, and the fissionable material thus generated will amount to hundreds of tonnes. Without underestimating the importance of international supervision of the storage of nuclear materials, we think it important that such materials be used effectively, for constructive purposes. We in our country see tremendous potential in the use of such materials to further the achievement of the following priority tasks: nuclear disarmament and conversion; improving the safety of nuclear-power plants; solving ecological problems; and supporting economic reform.

Russia attaches special significance to the Agency's efforts to enhance further its supervisory functions and its safeguards system. IAEA supervision is an effective international confidence-building measure, and can provide stable conditions for the development of cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. It is important for the IAEA to enjoy the unwavering support of the international community in that endeavour. For our part, we shall continue consistently to favour continued enhancement of the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, including enabling the Agency to carry out unannounced inspections.

Russia has been actively cooperating with the Agency in another important sphere of activity: nuclear power. The future of nuclear power in Russia must be viewed in the context of our overall energy policy, which is currently aligned with the new economic conditions in our country.

The Russian Federation also attaches great importance to promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, particularly with other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. As members know, the Russian Federation has been working under the Minsk Agreement to ensure safe management and international legal regulation of existing peaceful nuclear facilities in Russia and in other States of the Commonwealth of Independent States. We are particularly interested in the proposal to merge those efforts with similar IAEA efforts in the Commonwealth countries; here, in our view, the Agency could serve as coordinator.

The success of multilateral cooperation between the IAEA, Russia and the new States of the Commonwealth of Independent States could be based on a common understanding by Commonwealth States of the economic significance of the use of nuclear energy, on a wish to cooperate in enhancing the safety of nuclear power, and on an awareness of their responsibility to the international community with respect to resolving problems relating to nuclear power, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the environment, and nuclear and radiological safety.

Like last year, we note with satisfaction that the IAEA has successfully contended with its responsibilities in the fields of providing safeguards, promoting the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, and furnishing technical assistance. I reaffirm that Russia will continue fully to support this important and authoritative international agency in all areas of its activities.

Mr. MARUYAMA (Japan): First of all, I would like to congratulate Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on his reappointment. I would like also to express my delegation's appreciation for the statement Mr. Blix made this morning, in which he explained the major activities of the Agency.

In our view, the draft resolution before the Assembly, of which Japan is a sponsor, reflects concisely and in a balanced manner the basic tasks of the Agency as well as the main issues currently pending. As the preambular part describes well, safeguards and nuclear safety are essential for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is also appropriate to mention that developing countries have special needs for technical assistance. The individual priority areas are identified, in accordance with the tradition of the Agency, in the form of General Conference resolutions. The operative part of the draft resolution highlights some of the current issues.

I should like to take this opportunity to state our position briefly on some points in connection with the draft resolution.

First, on safety issues, my delegation notes with satisfaction that the Agency provided, in a very timely fashion, safety assistance for the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We attach importance to the drafting work, organized by the Agency, for a nuclear-safety convention, which is expected to enhance the level of nuclear safety world-wide. I also wish to express our concern over Russia's ocean dumping of

radioactive waste. My delegation looks forward to the Agency's contribution to tackling this problem.

Secondly, on safeguards, we underline the Agency's effort to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. In particular, the recent cases of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea deserve special attention. The very credibility of the safeguards system is at stake. I reiterate my Government's firm support and appreciation for the Agency's strenuous and painstaking efforts in this regard. My Government, together with many others, strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to retract immediately its decision to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to implement fully the safeguards agreement with the Agency and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Thirdly, as to technical assistance, it is my Government's established policy to promote cooperation with developing countries. The nuclear field is no exception.

To conclude, my delegation wishes to express its expectation and sincere hope that the Agency will meet the challenges it faces today and that it will continue to play a significant role in the important field of furthering the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt) *(interpretation from Arabic)*: It gives me pleasure to welcome Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to congratulate him both on his re-election and on the Agency's achievements over the past year. Those achievements bear witness to the important and enhanced role the Agency plays in assisting the international community to deal with the nuclear threat and, in making it possible for all countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The international order continues to undergo changes and developments that follow upon one another and provide propitious opportunities for promoting nuclear-disarmament efforts and enhancing international peace and security. There is no doubt that the International Atomic Energy Agency, which must continue to assume more and more responsibilities, will take advantage of the positive aspects of those international developments while warding off any negative elements which may be involved.

With the review and extension conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) pending, we must redouble our efforts at the international level to ensure the universality of the Treaty. We must ensure the commitment to renouncing the nuclear option by those States that have not yet acceded to the NPT. There can be no doubt that applying the Agency's safeguards in the case of those States is an essential prerequisite of confidence-building and the containment of the tensions that arise from the nuclear-arms race.

Egypt welcomes South Africa's openly declared renunciation of the nuclear option and its readiness to accept IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. This constructive development in South Africa's stance on the issue has gone hand in hand with progress now being made towards a comprehensive political settlement and the dismantling of the apartheid regime, developments which will ultimately lead to South Africa's reintegration into the African and international communities.

This gives rise to hope that similar progress may be achieved in the Middle East where efforts towards a political settlement are beginning to bear fruit. In this connection, Egypt wishes to state that political progress must be accompanied, if not preceded, by similar progress towards a commitment by all States of the region to renounce the option of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. This will be achieved only through accession by all States of the region to the NPT or through the application of the IAEA safeguards to all such States, without exception, as a prelude to their accession to the Treaty. Undoubtedly, this will have a direct effect on the promotion of mutual confidence and will strengthen the efforts now being deployed towards the establishment of peace.

Egypt urges all States of the region to respect the resolution adopted by General Conference of the Agency on 1 October last year regarding the application of the safeguards regime in the Middle East. I take this opportunity to express Egypt's deep appreciation of the Agency's role in this context, a role which will continue to receive our support.

I also wish to express Egypt's recognition of the Agency's invaluable role in advising the African experts engaged in the drafting of a treaty on the denuclearization of Africa at their last meeting in Harare. Egypt hopes that the treaty will be adopted at the next session of the General Assembly.

While such positive developments may give rise to hope, there are other international developments that continue to remind us of the perils of nuclear proliferation and of the need to strengthen the NPT regime without delay, as well as the need to remedy its shortcomings. Reasons for optimism include the Conference on

Disarmament's decision last August to give its Ad Hoc Committee a negotiating mandate for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban Treaty. Egypt hopes that nuclear tests, be they open or clandestine, will come to a complete halt. There can be no doubt that the Agency will play a leading role in providing the necessary technical assistance and advice to the Conference, both in the areas of reviewing adherence to the Convention and of reviewing subsequent implementation of its provisions. The approaching NPT Review Conference provides us with an opportunity to remedy the current shortcomings of the non-proliferation regime in order to encourage the Treaty's continuance in force and to dispel any fears on the part of Member States that have renounced the nuclear option and yet continue to feel threatened by the very weapons they have renounced.

We call upon all the States that have not done so yet, to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Its universality and the guarantees it provides to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them are likely to lead to the realization of its objectives. We also call upon the States parties to the Treaty to continue to respect their commitments and to strictly abide by them.

In recent years, we have clearly seen that the NPT regime with which the Agency is entrusted needs to be improved and strengthened in order to ensure that the Agency's tasks are seriously conducted. My delegation pays tribute to the Agency's endeavours in this respect, although, in the final analysis, it is the will of the international community which can make it possible to extend and strengthen provision of the Agency's services to all without discrimination.

Finally, I wish to conclude by voicing the hope that the Agency will continue to make further achievements and will receive from Member States their full support and sufficient resources that would enable it to discharge its weighty tasks.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.